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Abstract
This thesis utilizes game theory within a framework for updating optimal de-
cisions based on new information as it becomes available. Methodology is developed
that allows a decision maker to change his perceived optimal policy based on available
knowledge of the opponents strategy, where the opponent is a rational decision maker
or a random component nature. Utility theory is applied to account for the different
risk preferences of the decision makers. Furthermore, response surface methodology
is used to explore good risk strategies for the decision maker to approach each situa-
tion with. The techniques are applied to a combat scenario, a football game, and a
terrorist resource allocation problem, providing a decision maker with the best pos-
sible strategy given the information available to him. The results are intuitive and
exemplify the benefits of using the methods.
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Updating Optimal Decisions Using Game Theory
and Exploring Risk Behavior
Through Response Surface Methodology
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Updating optimal decisions based on new information as it becomes available
is widely applicable in such areas of research as combat scenarios, sports, financial
situations, and economic behavior to name a few. In each of these areas, as new
information becomes available regarding the possible actions of the opposition or the
possible states of nature, the idea of updating an optimal decision policy based on
this perception becomes of interest. Optimizing behavior in these situations is of
prime interest to military leaders, sports teams, and financial experts who face these
decisions. Further exploring the implications of risk behavior in approaching these
situations is of great importance as well. In addition, capturing the difference between
a perceived optimal strategy and the true optimal strategy will provide insight into the
quality of the information perceived. Furthermore, the methodology used to represent
rational decision making in the presence of uncertainty in many simulation models
is trivialized and an adequate method needs to be developed for general use in these
models. The perceived optimal strategy is many times counted as the true optimal
strategy. This leads to inaccurate output summary statistics.
1.2 Research Motivation
Bayesian updating is often used solely to update optimal decisions. This method
does not consider the action sets and knowledge of what actions are available to
either nature or another decision maker. This research considers availability of actions
and provides methods to optimize decisions based on this information, as well as
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techniques for exploring good risk behavior in each situation. Consider the simple
combat scenario where a tank observes an unknown object in the distance and must
decide what action to take. If the sensors of the tank indicate that the object is
an enemy tank, enemy armored personnel carrier, or a friendly tank, the tank may
have to choose whether to shoot at the object or investigate the situation further.
Depending on the mission, the tank may choose to do one or the other. If the sensors
of the tank give updated information that the object is an enemy tank or an enemy
armored personnel carrier, the optimal decision of the tank may be to shoot at the
object. However, if the true identity of the object is of a friendly nature, the perceived
optimal decision to shoot differs from the true optimal decision which may be to
advance. The difference between these two decisions can be thought of as the regret
of the decision maker.
Consider a second example of an engagement between a red tank and a blue
tank. If the sensors of the red tank indicate that the damage level of the blue tank
is a mobility/firepower kill, the perceived optimal decision of the red tank may be
to move forward and capture troops. However, if the true damage level of the blue
tank was only a mobility kill, the perceived optimal decision of the red tank to move
forward is less than optimal. The red tank will actually put itself unnecessarily in
harms way. Its true optimal decision may be to actually shoot again. This difference
between the true and perceived optimal decisions needs to be accounted for during
actual battle or in a simulation model.
If the information received and known by a decision maker is imperfect or in-
complete, decisions will be affected in proportion to the quality and quantity of the
information received. If two entities are engaged in a battle, this information will
have some effect on the outcome of this battle.
2
1.3 Research Objectives
This research aims to address the updating of optimal decisions based on infor-
mation available by developing methodology that will be useful during the decision
making process or as implemented in a simulation model.
The objectives of this research are:
1. Develop a methodology that automatically updates an optimal decision over
time based on the information available to a decision maker at each time step
2. Develop the methodology to capture the effects of incomplete or inaccurate
information on optimal decision policies by measuring the difference between
the perceived optimal decision, that is based on this imperfect information, and
the true optimal decision which is based on perfect information
3. Present a technique to explore the implications of decision maker risk behavior
and subsequently suggest better alternatives
1.4 Research Approach
Since many decisions are based on the actions of another entity or group and/or
the outcome of nature, this research proposes the use of game/decision theoretic
concepts to model the decision making process. Game theory is also used to update
the optimal decision based on the information available. This research focuses on
the modeling of two-player games between entities and two-player games between an
entity and nature. An entity may be a team or group of some sort depending on
who is making the decisions. A typical situation would include two tanks engaged
in combat, with an input from sensors as to the conditions of the vehicles and the
overall surrounding operating environment. In the nature case, one tank would make
decisions based on what its sensors, measuring some aspect of nature, are reporting
to him. This research unravels these problems and suggests an improved modeling
approach that could be employed during the decision making process, or implemented
in a simulation model, using game theoretic concepts. It focuses on the set of possible
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outcomes of the engagements by using the information available to update its optimal
strategy. To accomplish this, the game will be written in extensive form to capture
all of the possible outcomes. These situations provide the framework from which to
collect the necessary data or to distribute questionnaires for subject matter experts.
This gives way to the payoff matrices necessary to compute optimal strategies for the
players.
If perfect information is available, a perfect decision can be made based on
that information. If the information received is less than perfect, the effects of this
imperfect information on the outcome of the scenario need to be determined. This
is done through measuring the difference between the true optimal decision based on
perfect information and the perceived optimal decision possibly based on less than
perfect information. The outcome of a scenario given one has perfect information is
the optimal outcome. The outcome of a scenario, given one has received less than
perfect information, is referred to as the perceived optimal decision. The difference
between these two values is the degree of loss incurred because of this bad information.
Similarly, this difference between the perceived optimal decision and the true optimal
decision can also be thought of as the value of perfect information.
This type of rigid modeling assumes each decision maker approaches the situa-
tion in a similar fashion. This is not the case, thus utility theory is used to capture
the individual preferences of the decision makers. After the initial game scenario is
constructed, any decision maker can be represented through determining his utility of
the reward matrix. This provides flexibility to model most situations that may arise.
Additionally, a decision maker, unsure of the risk behavior with which to ap-
proach a situation or who suspects his past risk behavior has resulted in less than
desirable effects, would benefit from a study on the effects of risk behavior. Response




The methodology presented herein is dependent on several assumptions, further
research could surely be performed to account for most if not all of the assumptions
made in this effort.
1. Minimax/Maximin Principle - The players of the game are rational decision
makers. Player one is trying to maximize his minimum gain while player two is
trying to minimize the maximum gain of player one.
2. Zero-sum - The rewards of the outcome sum to zero. That is, the gain of player
one is the same as the loss of player two.
3. Sequential and Simultaneous - This theory is sequential in that each player
makes decisions based on one’s perception of the available actions to the other
player. However, it is simultaneous in that each player makes a decision without
knowing the moves of the other player with certainty before the game is played.
4. Non-Cooperative - The players of the game are in a conflict with one another
and the chance for cooperative bargaining to arise is zero.
5. Static Rewards - The rewards of the players of the game do not change over
time.
6. Compete Information - Each player knows the reward matrix and the initial
actions available to the other players with certainty.
1.6 Organization
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter I presents the problem, reasons
to improve, and the research method used to solve the problem. Chapter II reviews
the literature on game theory and its different applications as well as other methods
of updating decisions. Chapter III elucidates the methodology used to approach the
problem and gives examples of how to apply the techniques. Chapter IV utilizes
this methodology on a combat situation, a football game, and a terrorist resource
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allocation problem, showing the effectiveness of the methodology. Chapter V provides
conclusions and implications of this research and supplies future direction on the broad




Modeling the updating of optimal decisions and measuring the difference be-
tween optimal and perceived optimal decisions during decision processes and in sim-
ulation models has received minimal research attention. Game theory has not been
used to date as a methodology in a simulation model or during a decision process to
update optimal decisions given the information available at the time, nor as a way
to measure the difference between a perceived optimal decision and a true optimal
decision.
Game theory has been used in many facets since John von Neuman and Oskar
Morgenstern published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1950, the first
formal application of game theory. John Nash, the father of non-cooperative game
theory generalized game theory into different types of games so that it could be used
in various venues.
This chapter will review the game theory concepts that are used in this research
as well as scour the literature on the origins of some of these concepts. Further,
the use of game theory in a military concept will be explored with an emphasis on
modeling combat situations. The past attempts of updating optimal decisions using
the Bayesian approach are explored as well. The chapter focus is on game theory
principles as well as the many uses for game theory in military conflicts.
2.2 Game Theory Concepts/Terminology
Scholars are constantly adding new modifications to the theory of games, allow-
ing it to be used across a broad spectrum of disciplines. This research will utilize the
basic concepts of game theory, applying it in a unique manner. To understand the
past literature and the ideas presented herein, the basic ideas of game theory must
be presented.
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Decision theory differs from game theory in that one of the players is a non-
rational entity who acts randomly. These games are referred to as games against
nature. Decision theory can be thought of as a specific application of game theory.
The remainder of this section involves common game theoretic terms and con-
cepts referenced from [23]. A full list of game theoretic terms can also be found
here.
There are 5 basic elements to a game.
1. The players of the game -How many are there and does nature/chance play a
role.
2. A complete description of what moves the players can make, the set of all
possible player actions.
3. The information available to the players when choosing their actions.
4. A description of the payoff consequences for each player for every possible com-
bination of the actions chosen by each player.
5. A description of the all the preferences of the players over payoffs.
The following list provides some generic definitions for the theory of games.
Simultaneous Games All players choose actions simultaneously without the knowl-
edge of the strategy chosen by the others players, that is one must anticipate
what the opponent will do right now. These moves may actually happen at
different times but the actions of the players will be unknown to each other.
Sequential Games Each player makes decisions following a specific order. The
players can observe what decisions the other players made before making their
decisions. If the information they receive about the other player is truth, the
game is considered to be a game of perfect information.
Perfect Information Each player has all of the true information about the moves
of another player at the time of their decision.
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Imperfect Information The information received by one player concerning the
moves of another player up to that point is to some degree in error.
Non-Cooperative Game The players of the game are in direct conflict with one
another and situations for compromise do not arise. Cooperative games can
involve bargaining contracts outside the specific context of the game.
Payoff Quantitative amount of reward received at the end of each game.
Utility A function of the payoff which changes the payoff relative to the preferences
of each individual decision maker.
Zero-Sum Game The payoff to the players at the end of the game sums to zero.
One team is the winner and the other team is the loser.
Strategy The set of moves or actions that a player can make in a game. A strategy
must be complete and definitive, it must capture every possible decision a player
can make given any possible situation that arises during the game.
Pure Strategy An action that a player will follow in every possible attainable situ-
ation during a game.
Mixed Strategy A strategy that consists of a set of actions that will be assigned a
probability distribution, or a weight as to how often they will be played.
Minimax Principle A principle of playing a game that when utilized, provides a
common type of play. It tells the decision maker to choose the maximum of the
minimum outcomes of each decision.
Maximax Principle A principle of playing a game that assumes that the best pos-
sible scenario will occur. It tells the decision maker to choose the maximum
possible outcome of all the decisions. This approach is considered a risk prone
method of play.
Nash Equilibrium A set of strategies in which neither player will benefit by chang-
ing his or her strategy. In a mixed strategy game, the expected values of the
payoffs must be maximized.
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Normal Form A matrix representation of the outcomes that could occur at the
intersection of each of the decisions of the players. Thus if two players have 5
moves each, the normal form will be a 25 x 25 matrix of payoffs.
2.3 Game Theory in Literature
Nash [15] builds on Von Neumann and Morgensterns’ [28] theory of two-person
zero-sum cooperative games, in which players form various coalitions, by formulating
a theory about non-cooperative games. This is based on the absence of coalitions and
assumes that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or commu-
nication with any of the others. He proves that every finite non-cooperative game
always has at least one or more equilibrium points assuming the players are rational,
this being the players’ good strategy or strategies.
O’Neill [16] emphasizes through test results that while the minimax theory
produces high variability among decision makers, the overall average frequencies of
moves and proportion of wins when using the minimax theory was identical to the
actual players moves and wins in his experimental test. This validates the use of game
theory as a methodology for updating optimal decisions over time. Robinson [20]
shows the validity of the method where each player of a game chooses the best pure
strategy against the accumulated mixed strategy of his opponent up to that point in
time.
Recently, there is an increased interest in determining the proper ways to defend
against terrorist attacks. Harris [10] emphasizes the importance of using mathematical
methods to combat terrorism. Specifically, game theory is of particular interest in
determining optimal allocation of resources to defend against terrorists. He states
that a barrier to applying this is that the utility of the players must be considered.
Bier [4] talks about the optimal allocation of resources to defend against terrorist
attacks. She develops cost functions with probabilities of attacks based on the amount
of money used to defend a particular target. The concept of game theory is used to
account for the conflict between the enemy and the protector. She also states there
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is a need to apply this as a dynamic problem, updating the proper allocations based
on new information. Zhuang and Bier [31] find equilibrium strategies for terrorists
and country defenders. This is done in the context of resource allocations for terrorist
attacks and natural disasters. Sandler [21] also shows the use of game theory in
terrorism conflict. His future research recommendations include the need for multi-
period game theoretic analysis of terrorist operations. This research will apply exactly
to that area.
Arrow [1] discusses the intricacies of operations research and decision theory.
Any given problem is first stated as if it were in closed form so that it can be solved
using game/decision theory but it still must represent the larger model of truth.
Values must be assigned to the physical outcome of the decision situations. These
value are really just an estimate of the true value yet these value produce answers
that will have implications for future decisions.
Charnes et al [6] study chance constrained games where the players are not fully
in control of their strategies. At each time step, random perturbations with known
distributions are applied to modify the players’ strategy. The selection of the strategies
by the players are made before these random variables are formed. Stennek’s [25]
research verifies the concept of the attraction principle. In contrast with a strictly
dominated action which is immediately discarded from use, the attraction principle
states that if this strictly dominated action is left in the action space, the action which
dominates it should be played with higher probabilities. The research confirms the
use of this principle in psychological experiments.
Lipovetsky [13] shows the usefulness of game theory in economic situations and
advertising research using zero and non-zero sum games with and without complete
information, and cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The approaches pre-
sented are efficient and may broaden applications research in economics.
Game theory has proven itself as a useful tool in many disciplines. It is used in
economics to represent economic situations, as well as to describe how actual human
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populations behave under different scenarios. Game theory is also used in economics
as a normative tool that will suggest how people ought to behave. Game theory has
been used in Biology to explain the evolution of the 1:1 sex ratio, explain emergence
of communication between animals, and to analyze animal fighting behavior and
territoriality. In political science, game theory has been used in such areas as public
choice, political economy, and social choice theory, the players often being voters,
states, interest groups, and politicians.
2.4 Game Theory in Military Context
This research aims to model combat situations using game theory. The first part
of this section gives some general guidance regarding the usefulness of game theory in
a military context. Game theory has long been used to model war games; however,
not in the context of updating optimal decisions based on the information available
about enemy actions. The second part of this section shows some of these direct
applications. Although, the idea of updating optimal decisions using game theory has
not been used yet, it appears to have tremendous potential within the combat arena.
In essence, the military context provides the ideal environment for the application of
this methodology.
2.4.1 General Combat Guidance. Whittaker [29] discusses the changing
nature of the art of warfare including the shortfalls in our current wargame technology.
Specifically, the author argues that game theory provides a flexible and promising
framework to model representative strategies for improved automation of behaviors
in simulations. The basic concepts of game theory are covered as well as four areas
needing expansion for the realization of game theoretic wargaming. Thomas and
Deemer [27] express the validity of using games to model combat situations. In their
paper, they attack operational gaming as a valid technique for providing a solution
to a combat scenario. The uses of game theory in combat situations are given, with
an emphasis on the appreciation of what a game solution requires. Athans [2] states
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that command and control decision making in simulation models could be advanced
significantly via control sciences such as game theory. Pugh and Mayberry [19] delve
into the theory of measures of effectiveness for military forces. Although military
conflict appears at first glance to be a non-zero sum game, the approximation by a
zero-sum game approximates actual combat most effectively. Using a zero-sum payoff
function is rationalized to compare alternative combat strategies. They also stress
the importance of the measures of effectiveness on the validity of the strategies that
are available to each force.
Attrition modeling is a popular combat tool explored by the battle community,
with the mathematical analysis developed by Lanchester in 1916. An important
study of this using game theory was completed by Cruz et al [9] in which a military
air operation was handled using concepts from non-zero sum dynamic game theory.
The dynamic nature is achieved through observing the actions of the two forces over
time. Solan and Yariv [24] look at a 2-player game where information, perfect or less
than perfect, can be purchased by player one regarding the likelihoods of the future
actions of player two. The study involves a one-shot game where the payoff of player
two is his payoff in the original game, and the payoff of player one is the difference
between his payoff in the original game given his information and the cost of the
information device he purchased. This concept can be applied to any discipline where
one player is interested in private information about the other player in an incomplete
information game.
2.4.2 Direct Applications. Berkovitz and Dresher [3] utilize game theory in
the analysis of an air war at the tactical level. The strategies in the two-person game
are allocation decisions of aircraft among various theater air tasks that maximize
the payoff possible of that theater mission. The game is simplified from its original
form and major assumptions include that each side is aware of the number of planes
the other side holds. Caywood and Thomas [5] apply game theory to the battle of
a fighter aircraft and a bomber aircraft. They embrace the idea that the theory of
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games provides a valuable framework to evaluate future weapons systems. In their
example, the two planes are assumed to be rational decision makers. They also fixed
the factors in the engagement, including type, speed, altitude, and flight paths of the
aircraft involved. The successful use of game theory also required the payoff function
to be common to both participants, thus a zero-sum game. Sujit and Ghose [26] use
a game theoretical framework to optimize Unmanned Air Vehicle search routes. At
each search step, there is uncertainty in the decisions of the surrounding players and
constraints on the flight times of the UAV’s that drive the optimal search region.
Perry and Moffat [18] attempt to link battlefield intelligence and measures of
combat outcomes together by developing a measure of the knowledge possessed by
command and control when making decisions. The paper applies game theoretic con-
cepts to a radar and measures the effects of improved intelligence on combat outcomes.
This models a battle composed of many entities, different than a one-on-one engage-
ment. McEneaney et al [14] apply game theory to problems in Command and Control
for UAV operations, essentially a game of two forces competing with ground vehicles
and UAV’s attempting to win by accomplishing a mission. In their situation, one
player has perfect information while another player has imperfect information. New
theory is developed to deal with this situation, instead of using the standard method.
The authors reason that this approach is more applicable to this case, however the
computational costs are much greater leading to less fidelity in the model than with
the standard method, thus the trade-offs need to be studied prior to implementing
this method.
Ozdemirel and Kandiller [17] propose a semi-dynamic model to model land
combat at the tactical level. They model individual battles and stages together to
compose a game-theoretic setting at combat levels between brigade and platoon, but
not at the engagement level. Cruz et al [8] presents a dynamic state-space attrition-
type model of a complex military operation involving two opposing forces that can
be used to investigate the effectiveness of various game theoretic control strategies
applied to a complex system in an intelligent hostile environment. Krichman et al [12]
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uses game theory to assist forces with the allocation of resources. The state space
is discretized to allow the optimal allocation strategies and value of the game to
be calculated. Dynamic programming is used to solve these because the game is
continually changing.
2.5 Updating Decisions
Cooman [7] talks about updating beliefs based on incomplete information, how-
ever only in the context of Bayesian updating and missing information. A technique is
presented that allows the decision maker to account for missing data and incomplete
information when calculating probabilities. Sandoy [22] explores alternative Bayesian
updating approaches in the application area of a drilling operation. This type of
updating requires a procedure that automatically updates an assessment as new in-
formation arrives. Several alternatives are presented and the use of Bayes theorem
produces a fast and automatic updating procedure. Also noted is the fact that in
many cases, the reception of new information opens the need to rethink the entire
process and model. This research will address this exact issue.
In conclusion, the idea of updating optimal decisions based on the actions avail-
able to other decision makers has not been used anywhere, let alone in combat situ-
ations. However, the immediate impact this theory could have on combat situations
is apparent and the results could be extremely beneficial to the soldiers in Iraq. By
updating the optimal decision as new information is received about the opposition,
the soldier can guarantee that he is attacking each situation with the best possible
strategy. This will inevitably lead to the preservation of additional lives.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows the broad range of areas game theory is used, with a focus
on the military applications. The basics of game theory were provided to introduce
some of the general concepts that are used in this thesis. The previous methods for
updating optimal decisions are also presented. Although there has been much research
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in the field of game theory and decision updating, the methods herein for updating




Updating optimal decisions based on the information available at a given time is
trivialized in many simulation scenarios as well as during decision making processes.
Updating the optimal decision using game theory is an efficient technique that is
widely applicable. The difference between a perceived optimal decision and the true
optimal decision is not given proper attention in simulation models as the perceived
optimal decision is sometimes counted as the true optimal decision. In the same
sense, if uncertainty is present while making a decision, capturing the optimal decision
based on perception of the situation is of value. The effects of these perceived optimal
decisions impact the outcomes of situations, thus this difference must be accounted
for.
This chapter first presents a method to collect the pertinent data needed to ac-
curately model decision making processes or scenarios in a simulation model, and the
procedure for setting these up using game theoretic techniques. Secondly, a decision-
making methodology is developed that allows for the updating of optimal decisions
as a function of information available. Subsequently, a method to account for the
absence or malignancy of perceived information is proposed, this being a measure be-
tween the true optimal and perceived optimal decision of a situation. Next, a method
of accounting for the risk behavior of the individuals involved in the decision making
process is presented. Also developed is a method to explore risk behavior through
the use of design of experiments and response surface methodology. The analysis is
based on the specific situation and the desired outcome of the game subject to the
amount of variation willing to be accepted. Finally, example calculations are provided
to exemplify how the proposed methods are properly applied.
3.2 Data Collection
Initially, data must be collected to satisfy the desired metric that best represents
the situation. For instance, in a financial situation where one is deciding the amount
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of disposable income to dedicate to a portfolio consisting of stocks and bonds, an
obvious metric to use is currency. In a football game where specific plays are being
modeled, the best metric to use might be yards. In some situations there may be
numerous metrics that interact with one another. It may be best in these situations
to consider a scaled ranking of some sort. For instance, in a combat scenario, the
outcomes could be ranked using a Likert scale from -5 to 5, with -5 being the worst
possible outcome and 5 the best possible outcome to the situation.
3.2.1 Data Sources. The data sources that are used to compile the infor-
mation must be accurate and dependable. For example, to develop the appropriate
data so a combat game between two tanks can be properly modeled, it is essential
to survey veterans of live combat as subject matter experts (SME). The SME should
be knowledgeable in the vehicle or position they are describing. However, this does
not necessarily preclude experts who have not actually had combat experience. Their
experience in determining proportional differences between the outcomes of scenarios
is of primary importance. In general, data should be gathered from an accredited
statistical database. This ensures that the results formulated through the use of
these techniques are accurate. The insight gained from these techniques is entirely
dependent on the quality of the input data.
3.2.2 Components of the Game. In order to model a decision making pro-
cess, all components of the game must be well defined.
Player An entity who is playing the game i.e. two football teams or a vehicle such
as a tank in combat scenario.
Action Any move that a player can accomplish during a game.
Strategy The set of actions that a player can make in a game. This must be complete
and definitive, capturing every possible action a player can make during the
game. The strategy is also referred to as an action set.
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Reward The quantitative amount of payoff received or lost by each player at the
end of each play of a game. The two players payoffs will add to zero during a
zero-sum game.
Reward Matrix The matrix of rewards or payoffs associated with each combination
of actions.
Initially, the field expert must brainstorm all of the possible actions that could
possibly be performed during a game, this set of actions is denoted α = {α1, α2, . . . , αm}.
The possible actions of the other player must be brainstormed as well, which is denoted
β = {β1, β2, . . . , βn}. From here, all possible combinations of the action sets must be
expounded which results in the number of player one and player two combinations,
κ = m∗n. Each combination must be assigned a value, all κ combination values make
up the reward matrix R. Consider a simple combat scenario where each player is a
tank from opposing sides. The scenario is set up such that α = {Advance, Retreat}
and β = {Advance, Retreat, Shoot} for the two tanks. The combinations of these
actions are ranked on a Likert scale between -5 and 5, with 5 being the best possible
outcome. See Table 1 for an example of data collection for this simple combat game.
Before the proper data is collected, the players, their strategies, and the associated
reward matrix must be well-defined. This is done through conversing with known
field experts familiar with allowable assumptions. Now, the decision making process
can be setup and solved using game theory.
Table 1: Sample SME Survey








3.3 Game Theoretic Setup
To demonstrate the formulation and solution to a game theoretic problem, some
new terminology must be introduced from reference [23].
Normal Form Each row or column represents an action and each box represents the
payoffs to each player for every combination of actions. Generally, such games
are solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium A Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a set of strate-
gies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change
his actions. Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of
them would lead that player to earn less than if she remained with her cur-
rent strategy. For games in which players randomize (mixed strategies), the
expected or average payoff must be at least as large as that obtainable by any
other strategy.
Pure Strategy A single action that a player will follow in every possible attainable
situation during a game.
Mixed Strategy A strategy that consists of a subset of actions that will be assigned
a probability distribution, or a weight as to how often they will be played. This
is a probability of choosing a particular action at some play of the game, these
probabilities must sum to 1 over the set of actions.
A thorough overview of game theory can be found in reference [30]. The next
few sections present only the necessary ideas for this research.
Each player chooses his best strategy assuming that his opponent knows the
best strategy for him to follow, thus he maximizes his minimum gain. His opponent
chooses the strategy that allows the other to gain the least, attempting to minimize
the other players maximum gain. This assumption is fundamental to the theory of
games and is called the minimax/maximin principle. Player one will maximize his
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minimum gain while player two will minimize the maximum gain of player one. This
assumes also that each player knows the strategies available to the other players.
Initially, the game must be examined to determine if a pure strategy emerges
for each player, this is referred to as a saddle point. For a reward matrix R, the
condition that must hold for a saddle point to exist is:
max(rowminimum) = min(columnmaximum).
If a saddle point is not present, the game must be set up as a linear program and
solved using the simplex algorithm to determine the optimal mixed strategy for each




r11 r12 . . . r1,n−1 r1,n




rm−1,1 rm−1,2 rm−1,n−1 rm−1,n
rm1 rm2 . . . rm,n−1 rm,n


and the normal form of a game given in Table 2,
Table 2: Normal Form of a Game
β1 β2 . . . βn−1 βn
α1 r11 r12 . . . r1,n−1 r1,n





αm−1 rm−1,1 rm−1,2 rm−1,n−1 rm−1,n
αm rm1 rm2 . . . rm,n−1 rm,n
the following linear program can be setup
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max z = ν + 0w1 + 0w2 . . . + 0wm
s.t. ν ≤ r11w1 + r21w2 + · · ·+ rm1wm
ν ≤ r12w1 + r22w2 + · · ·+ rm2wm
...
ν ≤ r1nw1 + r2nw2 + · · ·+ rmnwm
∑
i
wi = 1; wi ≥ 0;∀i = 1, . . . , m
(1)
where γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} denotes a probability distribution assigned to the set of
actions α, the strategy of player one. ν is the value of the game, which player one
is maximizing in the objective function over the actions of player two, accounted for
in the constraints. This linear program can be easily solved via the simplex method
to solve for the values of this strategy. To compute the strategy δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δn}
of the action set β of player two, the dual linear program of Equation (1) must be
formulated. This is easily set up.
min z = ω + 0δ1 + 0δ2 . . . + 0δn
s.t. ω ≥ r11δ1 + r12δ1 + · · ·+ r1nδn
ω ≥ r21δ2 + r22δ2 + · · ·+ r2nδn
...
ω ≥ rm1δ1 + rm2δ2 + · · ·+ rmnδn
∑
j
δi = 1; δj ≥ 0; ∀j = 1, . . . , n
(2)
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Formally stated, a pure strategy occurs when the strategy for the action sets α
or β have the following properties: wi = 1 for 1 of m actions and wi=0 ∀ remaining
i’s or δj = 1 for 1 of δ actions and δj = 0 ∀ remaining j’s, respectively. A mixed
strategy occurs when the strategy for the action sets α and β consists of a probability
distribution for the actions that will be played, γ and δ respectively.
3.3.1 Value of the Game. The players’ mixed strategies result in a floor
value for player one denoted π. In other words, player one is guaranteed to receive no
less than π if his mixed strategy γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} is played. π is also the ceiling
value for player two, guaranteeing him from losing any more than π by playing his
mixed strategy δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δn}. When the value of the game to each of the players
is equal, a Nash equilibrium occurs. Consequently, any mixed strategy that results
in equal values of π meets this criteria and is considered an optimal strategy. It is
important to note that π is the expected value to each of the players over time. At
each play of a game, there will be some variation from π. As time approaches infinity
however, each player can expect their reward to approach this value, π.
The common value of the game π for each player is actually the solution to their
respective linear programs, π = ν = ω, however since the reward matrix R will be
manipulated in upcoming sections to account for player preferences, the equation
π = [γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm}] ∗R ∗ [δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δn}]′
= γ R δ ′ (3)
will be used herein. Note, the value of δ used for nature in the one-player versus
nature case is a uniform distribution across the strategy of nature. This is a valid as-
sumption because when information is unavailable regarding the likelihood of nature,
the uniform distribution provides the best estimate. In the two-player game, δ will
be the actual strategy used by player two according to the minimax principle.
23
3.4 Updating the Optimal Decision
The optimal strategy will change depending on the data available about the
action sets or strategy of the players of the game. The strategy γ for the action set
α at time step s is dependent on a player’s perception of what actions are available
to the other player. That is,
γ̂(0) = [γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm}|β̂(0) = {β̃1, β̃2, . . . , β̃n}]
for s = 0 at the start of the game. This shows that the strategy of player one, γ, is
based on his perception of what actions are available to player two, which is all of the
possible actions of player two initially. In general,
γ̂(s) = [γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm}|β̂(s) = {β1, β2, . . . , βo}]
= γ|β̂(s) (4)
where o is the number of actions perceived by player one. The inequality o≤n holds,
implying that player one can only perceive as many actions as he originally knows
player two is capable of choosing from. This will continue up to time step q, the
number of time steps in the game. As gamma updates, it is dependent on data
obtained from some source or combination of sources that is perceiving the situation,
or information about β. Thus β̂ is dependent on
ζ = {ζ1 ∩ ζ2 ∩ . . . ∩ ζk},
where ζi is source i of k number of sources. Thus,
β̂(s) = [β|ζ(s) = {ζ1 ∩ ζ2 ∩ . . . ∩ ζk}]
= β|ζ(s) (5)
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where ζ(s) is the set of sources available at time s. Thus,
γ̂(s) = [γ|{β̂(s)|ζ(s)}] (6)
showing that the strategy of player one is dependent on the information received from
the sensor and his perception of the action set of player two.
The reward matrix R and strategy of player two δ will update at each time step
as well depending on the player’s perceptions of the action sets available to the other
players, denoted R̂(s) and δ̂(s), respectively.
3.4.1 Difference Between Optimal and Perceived Optimal Decisions. During
a game, a player may not have true information about his opponents set of available
actions. The mixed strategy may not be the proper mixed strategy to use since it may
be based on false information, making it a perceived optimal mixed strategy, denoted
above as γ̂(s). The true optimal mixed strategy based on perfect information may be
used to determine how poor this perceived mixed strategy is. Before introducing this
technique, it is necessary to pioneer some fresh terminology from reference [23].
Sequential game These games occur when each player makes decisions following a
specific order. The players can observe what decisions the other players made
before making their decisions. If the information they receive about the other
player is truth, the game is considered to be a game of perfect information.
Perfect Information Occurs in a game when one player has all of the true infor-
mation about the actions of the other players or possible sets of actions at the
time of their decision.
Imperfect Information Occurs in a game when the information received by one
player concerning the actions of the other players or possible sets of actions up
to that point is to some degree in error.
The true optimal strategy is thus denoted γ(s). Similarly, the true reward matrix
is R(s) and the true strategy of player two is δ(s). If the information received via
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sensors or some other source ζ = {ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζk} is less than perfect (imperfect), a
difference will occur between the optimal strategy and the perceived optimal strategy.
That is, γ̂(s) is less than or equal in quality to γ(s). The magnitude of the difference
between the perceived optimal and true optimal strategies can be measured using the
value of the game. The value of the game π provides the best comparison measure for
contrasting two strategies. The value corresponding to the perceived optimal strategy
γ̂(s) is calculated using the perceived optimal strategy, the true reward matrix, and
the true strategy of player two,
π̂(s) = γ̂(s) R(s) δ(s)
′
. (7)
The value of the true optimal strategy is similarly calculated
π(s) = γ(s) R(s) δ(s)
′
. (8)
The difference between the values of the two strategies is
~π(s) = π(s) − π̂(s). (9)
This value, ~π(s), will change as the game progresses. Initially the difference between
the value of the game of the perceived and the true optimal decision is ~π(0) = 0. The
value, ~π(s), can be used to determine the value of obtaining perfect information and
also to measure the value of the information obtained from sources ζ = ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζk.
Note, this value may or may not be representative of the actual value because of the
nature of the measure. For example, in a ranking system, ~π(s) will provide a frame of
reference for which two different decisions can be compared and/or the value of the
source can be observed over time.
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3.5 Determining User Preferences
Traditional zero-sum game theory assumes that each player will approach the
game in an identical fashion, however this is not always the case. While it is true
that each player will attempt to maximize his minimum gain and minimize the other
players maximum gain, the values of the reward matrix R will not always reflect the
true value of the reward to each player. This difference in value is accounted for by
determining the players’ risk preference and changing the values in the reward matrix
to reflect this preference.
3.5.1 Utility. Since the reward matrices are, in essence, just data of what-
ever measure is decided upon to represent the game, utility theory must be used to
represent what value the reward of the situation has to each player. That is, the
true values of the situations to the players in some cases, when all other influenc-
ing factors are considered, is different than the general reward matrix. The original
reward matrix will produce strategies that can be thought of as the expected case,
the strategy a normal rational decision maker would take in a situation. Further-
more, utility will allow every type of decision maker to be represented based on their
individual risk taking behavior. That is, a decision maker may be risk averse, risk
neutral, or risk prone, of which there are different levels. The risk averse individual
will avoid risk more so than the risk neutral individual in the expected case, going for
the sure thing. The risk prone individual will approach situations with great risk in
comparison with the risk neutral individual; he will attempt to maximize his payoff
regardless of the chance for loss. The risk neutral individual will approach the situa-
tion as the average rational individual would, maximizing his minimum payoff for the
given reward matrix. This is explained better through an inspection of the reward
matrix. For a reward matrix R with strategy γ = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} and action set
α = {α1, α2, . . . , αm}, an action αi is considered a high risk action if its standard
deviation σi is large in respect to the other αi’s σi’s. The risk prone individual will
play this action more often. An action αi is considered a low risk action if its standard
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deviation σi is small in respect to the other αi’s σi’s. The risk averse individual will
use this action more often. This classification of the actions is also dependent on the
mean of choosing a particular action across the different possibilities of the strategy of
player two. This mean is calculated assuming a uniform distribution as the strategy
of player two and multiplying the reward across a particular action by this uniform
distribution. For example, an action with a low mean in respect to the other actions
and a high standard deviation may not be treated as a risk prone action when the
game is solved because the mean is too low to allow it even to be considered as a
viable action.
The utility matrix is conjectured using some function of the original payoff and
the risk tolerance level, which accounts for the players’ risk behavior. A popular,
widely used function is the exponential utility function which has been shown to be
extremely useful in evaluating risk behavior. The function transforms the original
reward matrix using a parameter, ρ, which accounts for the players’ risk behavior.
There are several forms of the exponential utility function, some may work better for
certain cases than others. From [11], for the monotonically increasing measure,
u{Rij} = 1− exp[−(Rij − Low)/ρ]
1− exp[−(High− Low)/ρ] , (10)
where u{Rij} is the utility of the ijth element of the reward matrix, Low is the
lowest level of the measure m, High is the highest level of m, and ρ is the exponential
constant, or risk preference, for the value function. Recall, m is the measure used to
compile the original reward matrix and is the basis for computing the expected case
strategy. Equation 10 will alter this original measure to produce the true value of the
original measure to the decision maker.
Varying levels of the risk tolerance will produce different types of risk behavior,
evident in the strategies of the players during game theoretic engagements. The actual
approach to determine ρ for each player is addressed in upcoming sections.
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3.5.2 Rho Assumptions. As the game updates, the risk behavior of the
players will evolve as well. A player may initially approach the game with a risk
averse attitude, then transition to a risk prone attitude as the game progresses. In
a one player versus nature scenario, only the risk attitude of player one needs to
be considered, and the results are just dependent on this risk attitude. Because of
the assumptions present during a two-player game, the values of ρ take on a slightly
different meaning. Examining the implications of the game theoretic setup from the
perspective of player one implies his decisions are based on the assumption that player
two knows his risk strategy and is attempting to minimize the maximum gain of player
one. This is really the zero-sum assumption. This is also the actual risk attitude










See Table 3 for a description of an example of high and low risk tolerance levels and
their meanings. In general, ρ approaching zero from infinity indicates a more risk
averse behavior while ρ approaching zero from negative infinity indicates a more risk
prone behavior. ρ = 0 is undefined for the exponential utility function and ρ = ∞ is
risk neutral behavior.





3.5.2.1 Certainty Equivalent. To actually determine the risk prefer-
ence parameter ρi of player i, for i = 1, 2, the certainty equivalent for each player
must be gathered. The certainty equivalent is the certain payoff a decision maker will
accept to avoid a given gamble. The certainty equivalent is obtained through a lottery
presented to the decision maker. The procedure for determining ρ for each player of
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the game will be presented in chapter four. The general concept of ρ is presented here
so a technique for studying risk behavior can be developed in the next section.
3.5.3 Studying the Effects of Risk Behavior. The combinations of levels of
ρ can be examined through plotting the different risk preferences of the two players
versus the value of the game. This can be observed on a three dimensional graph of
the surface, a contour plot of the three dimensional surface, or interaction plots of
the two variables and the response which is the value of the game, π.
3.5.3.1 Design of Experiments. Exploring the varying levels of risk
tolerance and their effects on the value of the game, π, through a designed experiment
is an efficient way to characterize their relationship to one another. If the analysis
needs to be done real time, and there is not time to look at every combination of levels
of risk tolerance, a design of experiment can be run to examine the high and low levels
of the risk tolerances and their effects on the value of the game. An adequate model
can be gathered in an efficient manner. This is important as it will provide the value
of the game as a function of the risk tolerances of the two players. This function can
then be optimized using response surface methodology.
The two factors that are varied are the risk tolerances of the two players, of
which the high and low levels will be examined. From Table 3, it is inferred that
each factor has 4 levels, discontinuous at 0. Note, the high and low levels of ρ will
be dependent on the certainty equivalent and the range of the values in the reward
matrix. These high and low values of ρ are for one example game. The exact procedure
for determining these levels is presented in chapter four. Three indicator variables
are used to aid in setting up a proper design matrix, representing the four different
combinations of the risk tolerances of the players. The resulting design matrix X
is given in Table 4. The design regions and graphical representation of the design
matrix is given in Figure 1.
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Table 4: Design Matrix(Original/Coded)
ρ1 ρ2 x1 x2 x3
-50 1 1 0 0
-1 1 1 0 0
-50 50 1 0 0
-1 50 1 0 0
-50 -50 0 1 0
-1 -50 0 1 0
-50 -1 0 1 0
-1 -1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
50 1 0 0 1
1 50 0 0 1
50 50 0 0 1
1 -50 0 0 0
50 -50 0 0 0
1 -1 0 0 0
50 -1 0 0 0
ρ1 ρ2 x1 x2 x3
-1 -1 1 0 0
1 -1 1 0 0
-1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
-1 -1 0 1 0
1 -1 0 1 0
-1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
-1 -1 0 0 1
1 -1 0 0 1
-1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
-1 -1 0 0 0
1 -1 0 0 0
-1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
The response matrix y, the value of the game π, is calculated by setting the levels
of ρ1 and ρ2, transforming the reward matrix accordingly, then solving the game for
each of the transformed matrices. y is different for each game played. The resulting
model is obtained using regression techniques, namely least squares estimation:
(X ′X)−1X ′y. (11)
The resulting model is
ŷ = θ0 + θ1ρ1 + θ2ρ2 + θ3x1 + θ4x2 + θ5x3 + θ12ρ1ρ2 + θ13ρ1x1 + θ14ρ1x2+
θ15ρ1x3 + θ23ρ2x1 + θ24ρ2x2 + θ25ρ2x3 + θ123ρ1ρ2x1 + θ124ρ1ρ2x2 + θ125ρ1ρ2x3 (12)
Since there is no residual error present, the variability in the y matrix is solely
due to the changes in risk behavior of the two players, thus only one replication needs
to be run. Now, the model can be optimized using robust parameter design. The












Figure 1: Design Region
to be accepted. Conversely, the variation can be minimized subject to some constraint
on the acceptable level of the response.
3.5.4 Robust Parameter Design. It is important to note, while absolute
optimization will be of value to the players of the game, formulating the response
surface as a function of the risk tolerances and learning about the process is of greater
importance. Approaching the problem from the perspective of player one sets the risk
tolerance of player one as the control factor and the risk tolerance of player two as
the noise factor, the uncontrollable factor. We are interested in not only the main
effects of the control and noise factors, but also the control × noise interactions as
they describe the variance in the response. In fact, all interactions will describe the
variation in the response but the control by noise interactions can be exploited to help
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design robust systems. A convenient way to examine the effects of risk behavior on
the value of the game is through inspection of the response surface, interaction plots
of the response, and contour plots of the estimated surface. These techniques have
not been used to explore risk behavior in the past. They will be examined in detail
in chapter four.
3.5.5 Optimizing Risk Strategy in the Game Against Nature. In the case of
the game against nature, an optimization problem for risk strategy would be fairly
simple. The value of the game π can be maximized across levels of ρ subject to some
constraint on the variability in π across levels of ρ. The mean and variance response
surface models are only functions of the risk tolerance of player one, subject to the
hypothesized distribution of nature. In fact, the variance model is a function of ρ,
however it represents variance in y across values of ρ. If the mean response surface was
linear and the variance non-linear, the decision maker could set up a linear program by
performing a LaGrangian Relaxation on the non-linear constraint. The mean could be
maximized subject to a constraint on the amount of variance willing to be accepted.
Conversely, a non-linear program could be set up to minimize variance subject to
some constraint on the desired mean.
3.6 Example Calculation for the 1-Player vs Nature Game
This research aims to model situations where a player is competing against an
outcome of nature. A natural situation where this occurs is on the battlefield during
a war. Consider a game where player one is a U.S. Army tank and player two is the
data being received from sensors on the battlefield. This section will demonstrate the
theory presented above on this scenario.
3.6.1 Modeling a 1-Player vs Nature Combat Game. Initially, some assump-
tions of the conditions under which this battle is being conducted must be stated. The
battle is set on a normal battleground, i.e. no urban clutter, etc., in the desert of Iraq.
The tank is observing an unknown object with its onboard sensors and is engaged
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with a hostile enemy whom the tank is attempting to overtake. Civilian casualties
are a concern and need to be minimized. Initially, the players action sets for this
situation must be determined through surveys of SMEs. The combinations of these
actions are then ranked using a Likert scale between -5 and 5. After collecting the
necessary data associated with all combinations of these action sets, the normal form
of the game is given in Table 5.
Table 5: Normal Form of Game against Nature
Enemy Truck Civilian Truck Enemy Tank Friendly Tank
Fire Mortar 4 -4 5 -5
Advance 1 4 0 4
Do Nothing -1 1 -2 1
The action set of player two is
β = {β1, β2, β3, β4} = [EnemyTruck, CivilianTruck, EnemyTank, FriendlyTank].
This is the actual data received by the sensor and is considered nature, or player two.
The action set of player one
α = {α1, α2, α3} = [FireMortar, Advance, DoNothing],
are the possible actions to take based on the information received from the sensor.
In reality, these actions set will be much larger and more complex. Setting the game
up to determine the optimal strategy for player one requires solution of the linear
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program
max z = v + 0w1 + 0w2 + 0w3
s.t. v ≤ 4w1 + 1w2 +−1w3
v ≤ −4w1 + 4w2 + 1w3
v ≤ 5w1 + 0w2 +−2w3




wi ≥ 0 ∀ i.
(13)
Using the Simplex method to solve the linear program yields the mixed strategy
γ = {w1, w2, w3} = {.2857, .7143, 0} for player one. Player one shoots his mortar
roughly 29% of the time, advances 71% of the time, and should always do something
in this situation. The value of the game to player one, assuming uniformity across
actions of player two, is
π = γ R δ ′
= [.2857, .7143, 0]


4 −4 5 −5
1 4 0 4












This value is the expected reward that player one will gain on each play of the game.
In this case, the rewards are on a scale so a higher value simply means better, where 5
is the best. The uniform distribution is used for the strategy of nature as this provides
the best estimate when information is unavailable. With information available about
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the actual probabilities from nature, these probabilities could be updated and thus
provide a better approach.
3.6.2 Updating the Optimal Solution. Suppose the tank (player one) received
information from an onboard sensor that fire was detected from the object and was
directed at the tank. His optimal decision will now change based on the fact that his
perception of the object is that of enemy nature,
β̂(1) = [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = OnboardSensor}]
= [EnemyTruck, EnemyTank].
The perception by the tank due to data received by the tanks onboard sensor is that
the object is an enemy vehicle. The original optimal strategy of player one
γ̂(0) = {.2857, .7143, 0}
changes to the updated strategy
γ̂(1) = [γ|β̂(1)]
= {1, 0, 0}.
Knowing that the object is an enemy, player one should shoot his mortar 100% of the
time. Suppose the tank received an update from an airborne sensor that the object
being observed was possibly a civilian truck. Now,
β̂(2) = [β|ζ(2) = {ζ1 = OnboardSensor ∩ ζ2 = AirborneSensor}]
= [EnemyTruck, CivilianTruck, EnemyTank]
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results in the strategy
γ̂(2) = [γ|β̂(2)]
= {.3077, .6923, 0}
with π = 1.5385 being the perceived value of the game. If another sensor reported the
object was either a friendly tank or civilian truck, the first sensor may be considered
obsolete. Thus,
β̂(3) = [β|ζ(3) = {ζ2 = AirborneSensor ∩ ζ3 = OtherSensor}]
= [CivilianTruck, FriendlyTank]
results in the strategy
γ̂(3) = [γ|β̂(3)]
= {0, 1, 0}
with π = 4 being the perceived value of the game.
3.6.3 Difference Between Optimal and Perceived Optimal Strategies. Dur-
ing a post-war analysis, suppose a decision-maker was interested in the performance
of a particular sensor during the campaign, take the onboard sensors for instance.
The value of the game based on information from the sensor can be calculated and




γ̂(1) = {1, 0, 0}
with π = 4. From observing the information from s = 2 to s = 3 and using tapes
from the airborne sensors, we assume that the onboard sensors have given a report
that is less than accurate. To gauge the quality of this information, first calculate the
true values based on truth, obtained from post-war analysis. Assume the true actions
available to nature are
β(1) = [CivilianTruck, FriendlyTank].
This produces a true value
π(1) = γ(1) R(1) δ(1)
′














the true value of the game at s = 1. The value of the perceived optimal decision is
calculated similarly using
β̂(1) = [EnemyTruck, EnemyTank].
with
γ̂(1) = {1, 0, 0}.
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The value of the perceived optimal strategy is
π̂(1) = γ̂(1) R(1) δ(1)
′















~π(1) = π̂(1) − π(1)
= −4.4− 4
= −8.4,
showing that there was a significant difference in the value of the game between the
perceived optimal decision and the true optimal decision. The value lost by player
one due to the information he received from the onboard sensors regarding the object
was 8.4, an extreme number considering the range of R is 10.
3.7 Example Calculations for the 2-Player Game
This section explores an intuitive example of the implementation of the pre-
sented methodology on a two-player game.
3.7.1 Setting up a 2-Player Game. This research seeks to model 2-player
games between competing entities, where each player is an entity of opposing forces
or teams. To demonstrate how to set up a game in this manner, consider the scenario
of an NFL football game, the Green Bay Packers (player one) versus the Chicago
Bears (player two) at Lambeau Field. The fidelity of the game is at the play-by-
play level, offense versus defense. Each play of the game will have a different action
set for each player, dependent on the time of the game, score, etc. Let player one
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(offense) approach this specific play with the action set α = {1, 2, . . . , m} being α =
[Option, Deep Pass, Short Pass,Run up the Gut] and player two (defense) with the
action set β = {1, 2, . . . , n} be β = [4−3 Prevent, 4−3 Man, 4−4 Man no blitz, 5−
4 Man blitz]. R, the reward matrix, is found by estimating the amount of yards
gained by the offense (and subsequently lost by the defense) at each of the different
combinations of the action sets of the players. This could perhaps be gathered through
past statistics of an average number of yards gained in each situation. The normal
form of the game is given in Table 6. The maximum of the row minimums is 4 in
R3,3 corresponding to the short pass. The minimum of the column maximums is 4.4
in R4,3 corresponding to the 4-4 Man no blitz. Since R3,3 6=R4,3, a saddle point does
not exist and the game must be solved using linear programming.
Table 6: Normal Form of 2-player Game
4-3 Prevent 4-3 Man 4-4 Man no blitz 5-4 Man blitz
Option 9.4 4.75 3.5 4.9
Deep Pass 2.1 3.75 4.2 15
Short Pass 7.3 4.5 4 5.1
Run up the Gut 4.9 4.1 4.4 3.2
Setting up the linear program to solve the game and extract the optimal strategy
γ for the action set α of the first player yields
max z = v + 0w1 + 0w2 + 0w3 + 0w4
s.t. v ≤ 9.4w1 + 2.1w2 + 7.3w3 + 4.9w4
v ≤ 4.75w1 + 3.75w2 + 4.5w3 + 4.1w4
v ≤ 3.5w1 + 4.2w2 + 4w3 + 4.4w4




wi ≥ 0 ∀ i.
(14)
40
Player one would thus approach the play by choosing an action according to the
distribution γ = {0, .0271, .3801, .5928}, or 3 percent of the time player one should
choose to call a deep pass, 38 percent of the time player one should choose to call a
short pass, and 59 percent of the time player one should choose to run up the gut.
Similarly, the optimal strategy δ for the second player can be found by setting up the
dual of Equation (14)
min z = ω + 0δ1 + 0δ2 + 0δ3 + 0δ4
s.t. v ≥ 9.4δ1 + 4.75δ2 + 3.5δ3 + 4.9δ4
v ≥ 2.1δ1 + 3.75δ2 + 4.2δ3 + 15δ4
v ≥ 7.3δ1 + 4.5δ2 + 4δ3 + 5.1δ4




δj ≥ 0 ∀ j.
(15)
Using the simplex method again to solve the linear program yields the mixed strategy
δ = {0, .4364, .5415, .0221} for player two. Player two should call the 4-3 Man 44
percent of the time, 4-4 Man no blitz 54 percent of the time, and 5-4 Man blitz
2 percent of the time in this particular situation. These mixed strategies allow for
randomness while play calling which keeps the opponent honest. For instance, on 2nd
down and 2, there will be some probability of calling a long pass.
A peculiar consequence of these mixed strategies occurs when one particular
action appears to get better in terms of the reward matrix. Perhaps the expected
yards gained for the option increases in the reward matrix, the play is working better
than in past seasons. The Nash equilibrium produces counterintuitive results in that
you may actually use the option less than when it previously was producing lower
expected yards. This phenomenon is due to the interactive nature of the game, player
41
two knows that the option is working better (the reward matrix is common knowledge)
for player one so he will decide to increase his defense against it. Player one must
choose to increase calling a different play in order to prove to the defense that he will
not be running the option. This further validates the use of this technique for the
game of football as this is often the mindset of the coaches.
3.7.2 Value of the Game. The value of the football game above is
π = γ R δ′
=
[




9.4 4.75 3.5 4.9
2.1 3.75 4.2 15
7.3 4.5 4 5.1












By playing his mixed strategy, player one expects to gain 4.24 yards with each play
of the game. Player two, by playing his mixed strategy expects to give up no more
than 4.24 yards with each play of the game in the long run.
3.7.3 Updating optimal play calling. If the quarterback approached the line
and observed the defense, then concluded that they were not in a 4-3, but possibly
a 4-4 or a 5-4, his mixed strategy would change due to this new information. The
normal form with the updated reward matrix is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Updated 2-player Game
4-4 Man no blitz 5-4 Man blitz
Option 3.5 4.9
Deep Pass 4.2 15
Short Pass 4 5.1
Run up the Gut 4.4 3.2
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The perception of the strategy of player two by player one is dependent on the
observation of the quarterback,
β̂(1) = [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = QBObservation}]
= [4− 4Mannoblitz, 5− 4Manblitz]
The updated strategy is
γ̂(1) = [γ|β̂(1)]
= {0, .1, 0, .9}.
With this new information, player one should throw the deep pass 10 percent of the
time and run up the gut 90 percent of the time. If a coach in the press box observed
the defense as a 4-4 man, the updated perception about the action set of player two
is




= {0, 0, 0, 1}.
3.7.4 Difference between Optimal and Perceived Optimal Decisions. The
difference between these two updates can be used to measure the value of the next
sensor observation, i.e., the coach observation. After the first update, the value of the
43
perceived optimal decision is
π̂(1) = γ̂(1) R̂(1) δ̂(1)
′















while the perceived value of the second update is
π̂(2) = γ̂(2) R̂(2) δ̂(2)
′











The perceived quality of the information gained can be measured by subtracting these
two values. Thus the perceived value of ζ2 is
π̂(2) − π̂(1) = 4.4− 4.38 = .02
yards. The observation of the coach resulted in a perceived expected increase of .02
yards.
This may also be used in a post-game analysis using a tape of the game. Suppose
the updated information strategy during the first update was γ̂(1) = {0, .1, 0, .9} with
the normal form given in Table 8, showing the quarterback perceiving the defense
to be in a 4-4 or a 5-4. However, the true defensive formations that player two was
selecting its strategy from was that in Table 9, a perceived optimal decision that
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Table 8: Updated Perceived 2-player Game
4-4 Man no blitz 5-4 Man blitz
Option 3.5 4.9
Deep Pass 4.2 15
Short Pass 4 5.1
Run up the Gut 4.4 3.2
Table 9: Updated True 2-player Game
4-3 Prevent 4-3 Man
Option 9.4 4.75
Deep Pass 2.1 3.75
Short Pass 7.3 4.5
Run up the Gut 4.9 4.1
differs from the true optimal decision occurs. The true value of the perceived decision
is




















while the true optimal decision would have resulted in a value of





















Table 10: Action Comparison
4-3 Prevent 4-3 Man 4-4 Man no blitz 5-4 Man blitz σi E(αi)
Option 9.4 4.75 3.5 4.9 2.6 5.6
Deep Pass 2.1 3.75 4.2 15 5.9 6.3
Short Pass 7.3 4.5 4 5.1 1.5 5.2
Run up the Gut 4.9 4.1 4.4 3.2 0.7 4.2
The loss associated with the perceived optimal decision in this scenario is
~π = π̂(1) − π(1)
= 4.0650− 4.75
= −.685
yards. This value could be graphed over time to determine how well the quarterback
is reading the defense or if the play calling is getting more accurate as the game is
progressing.
3.7.5 Football Risk. This section shows how the reward matrices change
with differing levels of risk tolerance. Suppose the normal form of a football game
is that in Table 10, where σi and E(αi) are the standard deviation and expected
outcome of the value of the game for action i computed across the action set of player
two. The high risk action in the case of the football scenario is the deep pass evident
by the high standard deviation. The lower risk actions for player one are the run
up the gut and the short pass. Setting the risk tolerance of player one to that of an




1 .9950 .9932 .9963
0 .9631 .9850 1
1 .9918 .9776 .9975




with strategy γ = {0, .0196, .8163, .1641} and value π=4.2425. Setting the risk tol-





0.00001367419 0.00000000124 0.00000000010 0.00000000168
0.00000000000 0.00000000016 0.00000000041 1.00000000000
0.00000020505 0.00000000075 0.00000000027 0.00000000251
0.00000000168 0.00000000033 0.00000000061 0.00000000005


with strategy γ = {.2498, .4955, .1355, .1192} and value π=4.2425. The risk prone
individual chooses to call the deep pass with a much higher probability.
3.8 Conclusion
Updating optimal decisions based on information available has received minimal
attention, modeling this with game theory is an efficient technique to accomplish
this. This chapter presented the methodology necessary to update decisions as more
information becomes available, along with a method to measure the difference between
perceived optimal decisions and true optimal decisions. The game theoretic techniques
used to model a scenario were presented, and a procedure was given that accounts
for the risk behavior of the players. Example calculations provided sufficient detail to
demonstrate the application of these techniques. In chapter four, this methodology is
applied to example scenarios and the consequences are examined.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The methodology presented in Chapter 3 is applicable in various fields of study.
Combat situations, any naturally arising two player games such as those that occur
in sports and recreation, strategic games, and proper allocation of resources are a
few simple examples. Updating the optimal decision based on the reception of new
information occurs in a broad range of areas; this chapter will demonstrate a few
applications. Specifically, a combat scenario will be explored as well as a sports
scenario. Finally, a resource allocation problem dealing with proper placement of
funds to combat terrorist regimes is explored.
4.2 Utility
Each player will approach a situation in a different manner, in fact, their ap-
proach to a situation may vary as time progresses. For this reason, the utility of a
value must be used to account for the decision maker preferences. This section sets
forth the procedure for accomplishing this, as well as a technique to automate the
risk behavior of a player based on his preferences in different types of situations. The
concepts in the next section are from reference [11].
4.2.1 Certainty Equivalent. The certainty equivalent is a value that is used
to determine ρ for the players of the game. The certainty equivalent may be found
in several ways. The approach used in this research presents the decision maker
with a proposition. The decision maker chooses the certain value that he prefers
opposed to a gamble between two uncertain values. For example, the decision maker
is faced with an uncertain gamble where 50% of the time he receives a value low and
50% of the time he receives a value high. The number he will he trade this gamble
for is his certainty equivalent. If the number is the expected value of the gamble,
.5∗low+.5∗high = .5(low+high), the decision maker is labeled as risk neutral. If the
number is less than the expected value, the decision maker is considered risk averse.
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If the value is greater than the expected value, the decision maker is considered risk
prone. The certainty equivalents are modified to obtain the standardized certainty
equivalent z.5 by using this equation:
z.5 = (CE − Low)/(High− Low). (16)
z.5 is then transformed into P by using Table 11. P is simply a standardized value of
ρ. This value P is then multiplied by the range of the numbers considered, range =
low + high. This value ρ is then plugged into the exponential utility function in
Equation 10 on page 28 along with the value x that is being examined for utility. The
utility of the number is then generated and used in place of the value in the original
reward matrix R.
4.2.2 Automating Rho. During an engagement where optimal decisions are
being updated as information becomes available, it may be of interest to automate
the risk attitude of a player towards a situation as it evolves. At the beginning of
an engagement, a player may be risk averse but as the engagement progresses may
decide to become more risk prone based on the actions of the other player or the
situation of the game. To enumerate every type of situation that may occur during
an engagement and ask the decision maker to determine a certainty equivalent for
each one is unnecessarily exhaustive. A more efficient way to fully characterize the
preference of the decision maker for each engagement is through the use of design
of experiments. Initially, a screening experiment should be conducted to determine
which factors play the biggest role in explaining the variability in the risk behavior
of the players of the game. The high and low levels of the factors hypothesized to
be important will be examined and a half factorial can be performed. After the
most important factors are determined, the important levels of these factors can be
examined through another designed experiment. Because of the fact that variance will
not be present in the response of the decision maker (unless several decision makers
are questioned), this resulting design can be used as a questionnaire to capture the
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Table 11: Certainty Equivalent Transformation
z.5 P z.5 P z.5 P z.5 P
0 - 0.25 0.41 0.5 Inf 0.75 -0.41
0.01 0.01 0.26 0.44 0.51 -12.5 0.76 -0.39
0.02 0.03 0.27 0.46 0.52 -6.24 0.77 -0.36
0.03 0.04 0.28 0.49 0.53 -4.16 0.78 -0.34
0.04 0.06 0.29 0.52 0.54 -3.11 0.79 -0.32
0.05 0.07 0.3 0.56 0.55 -2.48 0.8 -0.3
0.06 0.09 0.31 0.59 0.56 -2.06 0.81 -0.29
0.07 0.1 0.32 0.63 0.57 -1.76 0.82 -0.27
0.08 0.12 0.33 0.68 0.58 -1.54 0.83 -0.25
0.09 0.13 0.34 0.73 0.59 -1.36 0.84 -0.24
0.1 0.14 0.35 0.78 0.6 -1.22 0.85 -0.22
0.11 0.16 0.36 0.85 0.61 -1.1 0.86 -0.2
0.12 0.17 0.37 0.92 0.62 -1 0.87 -0.19
0.13 0.19 0.38 1 0.63 -0.92 0.88 -0.17
0.14 0.2 0.39 1.1 0.64 -0.85 0.89 -0.16
0.15 0.22 0.4 1.22 0.65 -0.78 0.9 -0.14
0.16 0.24 0.41 1.36 0.66 -0.73 0.91 -0.13
0.17 0.25 0.42 1.54 0.67 -0.68 0.92 -0.12
0.18 0.27 0.43 1.76 0.68 -0.63 0.93 -0.1
0.19 0.29 0.44 2.06 0.69 -0.59 0.94 -0.09
0.2 0.3 0.45 2.48 0.7 -0.56 0.95 -0.07
0.21 0.32 0.46 3.11 0.71 -0.52 0.96 -0.06
0.22 0.34 0.47 4.16 0.72 -0.49 0.97 -0.04
0.23 0.36 0.48 6.24 0.73 -0.46 0.98 -0.03
0.24 0.39 0.49 12.5 0.74 -0.44 0.99 -0.01
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decision makers risk preference at each combination of the factor levels. The design
will not be used to explain variance in the system, but rather as an efficient way to
automate ρ. Using the regression technique of least squares estimation,
θ = (X ′X)−1X ′y, (17)
where X is the original design matrix and y is the response, a model of risk behavior is
fit to the engagement. ρi, for i = 1, 2, can be automated based on any given situation
during the engagement. Naturally, more data collected about the preferences of the
decision maker will lead to a more accurate model of their actual behavior in each
unique situation. For the purposes of this research, the levels of the important factors
will be limited to a high and low case. In reality, many of the points between these
high and low levels will be of interest and will assist in postulating an accurate model.
A study can also be performed on the risk behavior of the players to determine
if they are approaching the situation in an optimal fashion. This can be done after the
fact as a post analysis or before the situation occurs to develop an optimal strategy
to approach the situation with.
4.2.2.1 Situation Vector. In these situations where the value of ρ can
be automated, a situation vector describing the characteristics of the current situation
and resulting value of ρ for player one is needed. Let,
St = {X1, X2, . . . , Xf , ρ1, ρ2},
where t is the time step of the game, f is the number of important factors, Xi for
i = 1 : f is the level of the important factor i, ρ1 is the risk tolerance of player one,
and ρ2 is the risk tolerance of player two. Notice t is different from s in Equation 4 on
page 24 in that s is the updated time step for each observation and t is the overall
time step of the game.
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In situations where a game may only last a few plays and the risk tolerance of
player one cannot be automated according to the situation, the risk tolerance notation





4.2.3 Limitations of the Reward Matrix. When using the exponential utility
function, the reward matrix is altered and extreme values may be used in calculating
the strategies of the players to account for the risk behavior of the players. This can
cause problems in the results if the reward matrix is not specified correctly. A short
example should be suffice to demonstrate. Consider the following normal form of a
game:
P1 ↓ P2 → Advance Retreat
Advance -3 4
Retreat 2 -2
When applying the exponential utility function to this matrix, the behavior of player
one as the levels of the risk tolerance change are not entirely intuitive, although
the reward matrix appears to be. See Table 12 for a display of the risk tolerance
levels and the resulting strategies. Player one actually retreats more frequently as
Table 12: Risk Tolerance Comparison of Original Matrix
Advance 0.1174 0.3288 0.3490 0.3612 0.3658 0.3721 0.3744 0.2655
Retreat 0.8826 0.6712 0.6510 0.6388 0.6342 0.6279 0.6256 0.7345
ρ -1 -5 -10 -50 50 10 5 1
he becomes more risk prone, that is as his risk tolerance approaches 0 from negative
infinity. Player one retreats more frequently as he becomes more risk averse as well,
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that is as his risk tolerance approaches 0 from infinity. Even though these values
are not intuitive, these are the actual values for this game setup. This is due to
extreme values produced by the utility function. Consider the same game as above
with normal form:
P1 ↓ P2 → Advance Retreat
Advance -4.2 2.1
Retreat 2 -.5
The values of the reward matrix have changed slightly from that in the original matrix,
however these new values still make perfect sense. In fact, the orientation of the matrix
has not changed, meaning R1,1 < R1,2, R2,1 > R2,2, etc. However compare the risk
behavior using this new matrix by observing Table 13. As player one become more
Table 13: Risk Tolerance Comparison of New Matrix
Advance 0.4542 0.3500 0.3191 0.2914 0.2767 0.2464 0.2076 0.0222
Retreat 0.5458 0.6500 0.6809 0.7086 0.7233 0.7536 0.7924 0.9778
ρ -1 -5 -10 -50 50 10 5 1
risk prone, he advances with greater probability. As player one becomes more risk
averse, he retreats most of the time. This is entirely intuitive, as opposed to the
original matrix.
Now, suppose the orientation of the matrix actually changed but the matrix
again still made sense in terms of the game. Instead of R1,2 > R2,1, R1,2 < R2,1. The
risk strategies make even better sense with this updated matrix as shown in Table 14.
P1 ↓ P2 → Advance Retreat
Advance -4.2 1.8
Retreat 3 -2.5
These simple examples show the importance of correctly designating the reward ma-
trix.
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Table 14: Risk Tolerance Comparison Changed Orientation Matrix
Advance 0.7682 0.5483 0.5139 0.4855 0.4710 0.4417 0.4046 0.1543
Retreat 0.2318 0.4517 0.4861 0.5145 0.5290 0.5583 0.5954 0.8457
ρ -1 -5 -10 -50 50 10 5 1
4.2.3.1 Implications. A key observation is that the expected case
in all of these matrices is very similar. This shows that although two matrices can
seem quite similar and produce similar results using traditional game theory, using the
exponential utility function may accentuate the error in the matrices. This error is the
difference between the constructed reward matrix and the true reward matrix. When
the exponential transformations are applied, it is imperative that the constructed
matrices be as accurate as possible. This is accomplished through using accurate data
when it is available, or getting the adequate amount of surveys when constructing a
rating type matrix. Small deviations in the reward matrix can cause major disruptions
in the use of the exponential utility function. Yet, even though the strategies of
player one are not intuitive in the above example, these are the actual strategies for
this game setup. This is due to the extreme values produced by the utility function.
The utility function actually accentuates any error present between the conjectured
reward matrix and nature’s truth. This error is actually in the relationships between
the action sets of each player. See Tables 16 and 17 to see the values produced from
the original game setup in Table 15 using the exponential utility function with risk
tolerances of 1 and -1. Comparing Table 16 with Table 15, in the risk prone case
with a risk tolerance of -1, the value of 4 to the decision maker is worth almost
10 times the value of 2. In the risk averse case, with a risk tolerance of 1, the
value of 4 is worth essentially the same amount as the value of 2. An implication
of this phenomenon is that a ranking type construction of the reward matrix may
not be sufficient to produce accurate results when employing the exponential utility
function. While using traditional game theory, the ranking system actually produces
extremely intuitive results and is quite convenient; however it is invalidated for use
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as the reward matrix when the exponential utility function is used to transform the
matrix. A possible use of a ranking type system is to initially designate the orientation
of the matrix. After ranking the possible outcomes from worst to best, actual values
can be assigned for the reward matrix based on this initial orientation. This will
eliminate the chance of composing a reward matrix that produces counterintuitive
results.
Table 15: Original Reward Matrix
RT = ∞ Advance Retreat
Advance -3 4
Retreat 2 -2
Table 16: Risk Prone Transformed Reward Matrix
RT = -1 Advance Retreat
Advance 0 1
Retreat .1345 .0016
Table 17: Risk Averse Transformed Reward Matrix




Modeling combat situations between an entity and nature using game theory
is an effective modeling technique for use in simulation models or during and after
an actual battle. The quality of the information input into the game will have a
direct effect on the quality of the outputs of the simulation. Thus, the inputs must
be representative of the true combat scenarios in order to produce accurate combat
situations or games.
This section first presents the initial setup of an example combat game. Next, an
analysis of the number of surveys collected N and how this directly affects the outputs
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of the combat game is studied. This analysis will provide the adequate number of
surveys to collect that will verify the use of this methodology in a combat scenario.
The methodology will then be applied to an example combat game and a proper
analysis conducted.
4.3.1 Game Setup. Initially, the action sets α of player one and β of nature
must be brainstormed by knowledgeable decision makers. Suppose that after thinking
about a situation in which a tank observes an object in the distance,
α = [ShootMortar, Advance,DoNothing, Communicate]
while
β = [EnemyTruck, CivilianTruck, EnemyTank,
EnemyArmoredPersonnelCarrier, FriendlyTank]
in the one player versus nature case, where nature, β, is the sensor inputs to player
one. Recall Table 1 on page 19 where the combinations of the action sets are assigned
a rank based on a scale of severity from -5 to 5. A survey is given to expert operators
questioning what the outcome is for the situations in Table 18. The table shows a
hypothetical response by one subject matter expert. Keep in mind throughout this
example that in the one player versus nature game, we only need to be concerned
with the strategy of player one.
4.3.1.1 Assumptions. Some assumptions must be made and presented
to the SME’s in order to ensure stability of the responses. For example, one SME
could assume the civilian truck may possibly be a suicide bomber or an innocent
civilian while another assumes it just to be an innocent civilian. This would result in
extreme differing values in the reward matrix. These assumptions should be clearly
stated whenever a reward matrix is being formulated.
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Table 18: User Survey Data
Player 1 Nature Reward
Shoot Mortar Enemy truck 3
Advance Enemy truck -3
Do nothing Enemy truck -2
Communicate Enemy truck 2
Shoot Mortar Civilian Truck -4
Advance Civilian Truck 5
Do nothing Civilian Truck 3
Communicate Civilian Truck -3
Shoot Mortar Enemy Tank 4
Advance Enemy Tank -5
Do nothing Enemy Tank -2
Communicate Enemy Tank 3
Shoot Mortar Enemy APC 5
Advance Enemy APC -4
Do nothing Enemy APC -3
Communicate Enemy APC 4
Shoot Mortar Friendly Tank -5
Advance Friendly Tank 5
Do nothing Friendly Tank 3
Communicate Friendly Tank -3
• Normal battle scenario based in the desert
• Tank observes an unknown object with onboard sensors
• Tank is at war with a hostile enemy
• Mission is to destroy enemies on sight
• Trying to minimize civilian casualties
• Enemy truck houses men with weapons
• Civilian truck is innocent
• Communication implies radioing for backup
Stating the assumptions up front ensures the SME’s fully understand the scenario.
4.3.1.2 Survey Response Effects. Each SME will differ slightly in their
opinion of the outcomes in Table 18. As the number of surveys N approaches infinity,
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the reward matrix R will approach the true reward matrix. The number of surveys
collected will have an impact on the quality of the information gleaned from this
combat game. The best comparison parameter is the value of the game π to player
1. In Figure 2, the simulated value of the game approaches the true value of the
game, π = .0588, as the number of survey responses increases. The simulation was
generated using the Matlab programming language. Intuitive response variation was
assigned to the responses of the SME’s.



























Figure 2: Effect of N on Response
4.3.2 Running the Game. After receiving and averaging the survey re-
sponses from the subject matter experts, the normal form of the game is given in
Table 19. Keep in mind, the values here are just rated values so their meanings are
only relative.
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Table 19: Normal Form of Combat Game
Enemy truck Civilian Truck Enemy Tank Enemy APC Friendly Tank
Shoot Mortar 2.6 -4.6 4.7 5 -4.1
Advance -2.7 4.9 -5 -3.7 5
Do nothing -1.2 1.6 -1.9 -3.2 3.6
Communicate 1.7 -1.9 2.8 2.5 -1.6
.
Initially, the game must be examined for a saddle point, this particular game
does not have a saddle point and must be solved using linear programming.
max z = v + 0w1 + 0w2 + 0w3 + 0w4
s.t. v ≤ 2.6w1 − 2.7w2 − 1.2w3 + 1.7w4
v ≤ −4.6w1 + 4.9w2 + 1.6w3 − 1.9w4
v ≤ 4.7w1 − 5w2 − 1.9w3 + 2.8w4
v ≤ 5w1 − 3.7w2 − 3.2w3 + 2.5w4




wi ≥ 0 ∀ i.
which yields the mixed strategy
γ̂(0) = {w1, w2, w3, w4}
= {0, .3214, 0, .6786}.
This is the expected case, the probability distribution player one should follow in this
game if he is risk neutral. 32% of the time he should advance further and 67% of the
time he should communicate. This may not always be the strategy that player one
chooses to run because of the manner in which he views the game. Table 20 shows a
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comparison of the strategies associated with different risk behaviors. Recall the risk
behavior associated with the values of ρ:
-1 - Extremely Risk Prone
-10 - Moderately Risk Prone
|∞| - Expected Case or Risk Neutral
10 - Moderately Risk Averse
1 - Extremely Risk Averse
If a player is an extremely risk prone individual, his mortar is shot 91 percent of the
time and he advances with probability .09. If the player is extremely risk averse, 79
percent of the time he should communicate for backup and 21 percent of the time he
should do nothing, but he should never shoot or advance.
Table 20: Risk Behavior Comparison
Rho -1 -10 Infinity 10 1
Player 1 Actions
Shoot Mortar 0.9089 0.5662 0 0 0
Advance 0.0911 0.4338 0.3214 0.2123 0
Do nothing 0 0 0 0.1694 0.2135
Communicate 0 0 0.6786 0.6184 0.7865
Value of Game (π) -0.1817 -0.0055 0.2857 0.2204 0.2034
The effects of the risk behavior of player one can be studied in relation to the
strategy of player two. As shown in Table 20, the optimal strategy, noted by the
value of the game, is always the expected case, player one is maximizing his minimum
gain. This is true whenever it is hypothesized that player two is using the maximin
principle. Any deviation from this behavior causes a decrease in the expected value
of the game to player one. In this case, player two is nature and thus will not always
use the maximin principle, there are number of different strategies that may occur.
Therefore it doesn’t make sense to compare the value of the game for different risk
strategies of the two players of the game. This is only useful during the two-player
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game. The main study then is the variation in the response due to the selection of a
certain risk behavior given a distribution on the probable outcomes of nature. This
will be accomplished during the post-war analysis.
Next, suppose the tank receives information from its sensors that the sighted
object is a tank of some sort, a tracked vehicle. The action set player one perceives
nature to be choosing from is dependent on his sensors. Recall Equation 5 on page 24,
β̂(1) = [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = OnboardSensor}]
= {EnemyTank, EnemyAPC, FriendlyTank}
The strategy of player one will update due to his perception of the action set of player
two, that is
γ̂(1) = [γ|β̂(1)]
= {0, .2437, .0899, .6663}.
The percentage of time player one advances is decreased due to his gained knowledge,
and the percentage of time he does nothing and waits is increased. This makes
sense because if he knows the object is most likely a tank of enemy nature (uniform
distribution raised from .2 to .33), he may incur more damage by advancing. However,




(−1) = {.5745, .4255, 0, 0}.
The risk prone individual will take extreme measures to accomplish his mission. Next,
suppose the tank received information from an airborne reconnaissance source that
the tracked vehicle was heavily armored, indicating that the object was indeed a tank
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but not an armored personnel carrier. Now,
β̂(2) = [β|ζ(2) = {ζ1 = OnboardSensor ∩ ζ2 = AirborneReconnaissance}]
= [EnemyTank, FriendlyTank]
with a resulting strategy
γ̂
(2)
(0) = {0, 0, .4444, .5556}.
Since player one is unsure the identity of the tank, it makes sense for him to do nothing
and wait for more information or communicate for backup from friendly forces.
Finally, suppose the tank receives visual confirmation from a special forces troop
that the object is indeed an enemy tank. The perceived optimal strategy is based on
β̂(3) = [β|ζ(3) = {ζ1 = OnboardSensor ∩ ζ2 = AirborneReconnaissance ∩ ζ3 = SpecialForces}]
= [EnemyTank]
and results in the strategy
γ̂
(3)
(0) = {1, 0, 0, 0}.
Player one will always shoot his mortar in this situation based on his perception that
the object is an enemy tank.
Consider now the case where ζ3, the special forces troop, was in error regarding
the identity of the object. In fact, the information received up to the point of the
special forces input was correct, however the special forces troop mistakenly failed to
identify the object as a friendly tank. Thus the true optimal strategy of the game is
γ
(3)
(0) = {0, 1, 0, 0},
player one should advance every time in the situation where the object is a friendly
tank. The regret of the perceived optimal strategy can be measured using Equa-
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tion 9 on page 26, where
π̂(3) = γ̂(3) R(3) δ(3)
′











is the perceived optimal value of the game given the truth and
π(3) = γ(3) R(3) δ(3)
′











is the true optimal value of the game. Equation 9 on page 26 yields the following
regret for player one because of his decision:
~π(3) = π̂(3) − π(3)
= (−4.1)− 5
= −9.1.
This is a very high regret as would be the case if a mortar was shot at a friendly tank.
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Player two (nature) will always be only one of the objects in the original action
set. This is why the perceived optimal strategy is multiplied by the column in the
reward matrix corresponding to the true identity of the object. This gives the true
value of the perceived optimal strategy.
4.3.3 Post-Battle Analysis. The methodology in this research can be applied
in hindsight to provide feedback on the performance of the sensors of a tank and
intuition on future strategies to approach similar situations with.
The initial game can be examined for insight on the possible strategies that
player one should take in the future. In Figure 3, it is observed that by player one
choosing to approach the initial game in an extreme risk prone manner, he can expect
to gain more value than by using the expected case. This is based on the assumption
that the probabilities of the outcome of nature is uniform, δ (U) for β.
The best way to explore the consequences of different risk behavior on the
outcome of the game is through examining all of the possible outcomes and noting
the value that each strategy produces at each of the possible outcomes. This can
be accomplished through exploration of the response surface, observing the expected
gain at each of the risk strategies, or looking individually at each interaction plot.
Table 21 shows the risk strategies of player one and the possible outcomes of the
situation, or the moves of nature for the initial game. These values are calculated by
multiplying the strategy produced by the risk tolerance of player one with the sure
outcome of nature column of R. For example, with ρ = −1, the strategy of player
one is
γ(−1) = {.9089, .0911, 0, 0}.
The first column of R is used to calculate the value of this strategy when the truth
of player two is the Enemy Truck. The value of the risk prone strategy when player
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Table 21: Risk Tolerance Comparison
Risk Tolerance (ρ) -1 -2 -5 -10 -20 -50
Enemy Truck 2.1172 1.3303 0.5786 0.3011 0.3470 0.3094
Civ Truck -3.7345 -2.3242 -0.9767 -0.4792 0.1909 0.2492
Enemy Tank 3.8163 2.3762 1.0004 0.4925 0.4016 0.3348
Enemy APC 4.2074 2.9158 1.6818 1.2263 0.5936 0.5405
Friendly Tank -3.2710 -1.9200 -0.6292 -0.1528 0.4294 0.4860
Mean 0.6271 0.4756 0.3310 0.2776 0.3925 0.3839
StDev 3.8545 2.4431 1.1142 0.6528 0.1454 0.1235
Risk Tolerance (ρ) 50 20 10 5 2 1
Enemy Truck 0.2944 0.2490 0.2749 0.3505 0.7199 1.0809
Civ Truck 0.2724 0.1996 0.1362 -0.0107 -0.7171 -1.1528
Enemy Tank 0.3082 0.2920 0.3483 0.4959 1.2115 1.7967
Enemy APC 0.5193 0.2207 0.2186 0.2759 0.5735 1.2832
Friendly Tank 0.5085 0.7001 0.6816 0.5942 0.1575 -0.4899
Mean 0.3805 0.3323 0.3319 0.3411 0.3891 0.5036
StDev 0.1225 0.2085 0.2103 0.2324 0.7241 1.2594
two is an Enemy Truck is










The mean of the risk prone approach is calculated assuming a uniform distribution of
the actions of nature. This is a valid assumption with prior information unavailable.
The mean and standard deviation are calculated across all the possible actions of
nature for each action of player one. This gives the expected reward player one can
gain along with the amount of variation expected for each risk strategy of player one.
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Table 21 shows that as the risk tolerance of player one approaches the risk neutral
or expected case, the expected value of the game decreases as well as the standard
deviation. As player one becomes more risk neutral, he can expect to achieve low
variation in the value of the game, but as he becomes more risk prone, he can expect
a much larger variation in the value of the game. Figure 3 shows the mean and variance
of the initial scenario. The variance increases as player one becomes more risk prone
or risk averse. This type of chart can be used to weigh tradeoffs of using different risk
strategies. For instance, if player one was constrained to gaining a certain amount
of value but the chance for loss needed to minimal, the expected case may be the
best choice. However, if the player could afford a possible loss for a greater gain, he
























































































Variance of Risk Averse Strategy
Figure 3: Effects of ρ on Game Value
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update of the game, and will be different for each game.
Suppose now that a priori information was available regarding the possible
outcomes of nature, the best strategy for player one will change. Consider the same
example above with an a priori distribution on the actions of nature such that the













Figure 4 shows the updated mean and variance plot. Table 22 shows the updated
comparisons as well. The mean increased significantly in the risk prone case with the
updated probabilities, while the variance stayed roughly the same. It makes sense that
when there is a higher probability that the object is an enemy, risk prone behavior
will be more beneficial. There is still a chance of an extremely bad outcome though
shown by the large variance.
Consider one more case where the information known about the distribution of













Figure 5 and Table 23 show the updated mean and variance plots and com-
parison values. The expected gain for player one is very low if he chooses to play

































































































Variance of Risk Averse Strategy
Figure 4: Effects of ρ on Game Value
some sort. The variance stays roughly the same indicating that it is still possible to
gain a great deal by being risk prone, just more unlikely than in the above cases. In
this scenario, the best risk strategy is the risk neutral expected case. This ensures a
certain expected reward with virtually no variation.
Again, this can be explored for each update of the reward matrix during a game.
The scenarios will differ with different games and with different a priori distributions.
There are numerous possibilities here, only the surface has been scratched with the
above examples.
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Table 22: Updated Risk Tolerance Comparison
Risk Tolerance -1 -2 -5 -10 -20 -50
Enemy Truck 2.1172 1.3303 0.5786 0.3011 0.3470 0.3094
Civ Truck -3.7345 -2.3242 -0.9767 -0.4792 0.1909 0.2492
Enemy Tank 3.8163 2.3762 1.0004 0.4925 0.4016 0.3348
Enemy APC 4.2074 2.9158 1.6818 1.2263 0.5936 0.5405
Friendly Tank -3.2710 -1.9200 -0.6292 -0.1528 0.4294 0.4860
Mean 2.8228 1.8251 0.8720 0.5201 0.4199 0.3741
StDev 4.5699 2.8714 1.2678 0.7069 0.1486 0.1240
Risk Tolerance 50 20 10 5 2 1
Enemy Truck 0.2944 0.2490 0.2749 0.3505 0.7199 1.0809
Civ Truck 0.2724 0.1996 0.1362 -0.0107 -0.7171 -1.1528
Enemy Tank 0.3082 0.2920 0.3483 0.4959 1.2115 1.7967
Enemy APC 0.5193 0.2207 0.2186 0.2759 0.5735 1.2832
Friendly Tank 0.5085 0.7001 0.6816 0.5942 0.1575 -0.4899
Mean 0.3559 0.2849 0.3137 0.4024 0.8365 1.2890

































































































Variance of Risk Averse Strategy
Figure 5: Effects of ρ on Game Value
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Table 23: 2nd Updated Risk Tolerance Comparison
Risk Tolerance -1 -2 -5 -10 -20 -50
Enemy Truck 2.1172 1.3303 0.5786 0.3011 0.3470 0.3094
Civ Truck -3.7345 -2.3242 -0.9767 -0.4792 0.1909 0.2492
Enemy Tank 3.8163 2.3762 1.0004 0.4925 0.4016 0.3348
Enemy APC 4.2074 2.9158 1.6818 1.2263 0.5936 0.5405
Friendly Tank -3.2710 -1.9200 -0.6292 -0.1528 0.4294 0.4860
Mean -1.8154 -1.0582 -0.3348 -0.0678 0.3408 0.3715
StDev 4.7238 2.9849 1.3400 0.7585 0.1565 0.1243
Risk Tolerance 50 20 10 5 2 1
Enemy Truck 0.2944 0.2490 0.2749 0.3505 0.7199 1.0809
Civ Truck 0.2724 0.1996 0.1362 -0.0107 -0.7171 -1.1528
Enemy Tank 0.3082 0.2920 0.3483 0.4959 1.2115 1.7967
Enemy APC 0.5193 0.2207 0.2186 0.2759 0.5735 1.2832
Friendly Tank 0.5085 0.7001 0.6816 0.5942 0.1575 -0.4899
Mean 0.3837 0.3864 0.3598 0.2911 -0.0418 -0.3064
stdev 0.1225 0.2171 0.2126 0.2391 0.8697 1.5511
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4.4 Sports Application
This methodology fits nicely to a football game where the offense is attempting
to audible plays based on the observations of the quarterback or coaches. Initially, the
game can be set up for each situation of the game. As the quarterback approaches the
line, and the coach observes the defense from the sidelines or press box, the defensive
formation can be estimated thus eliminating some of the possible defensive setups.
This leads to an updated offensive strategy that is based on this perception. The risk
behavior of the teams can also be estimated and will change with each play of the
game.
4.4.1 Initial Game Setup. Initially, the plays that are available to each team
must be determined for various situations during the game. For instance, when the
offense is within 10 yards of the opponents endzone, the long pass is not a possible
action to call. Most plays will be available the majority of the game. After the
action sets are determined for the offense and defense, the proper statistics must be
gathered from past games. Each situation where the offensive action has been used
against the defensive formation must be assigned an average number of yards gained
from statistical data. Table 24 shows an example of the normal form of a football
game after data collection. The defensive formations are designed to limit certain
plays, here are the plays that are best defended against by each formation:
• 4-4 Overload - Sweep
• 5-4 Blitz - Middle Run
• 4-4 Zone - Short Pass
• 4-3 Man - Long Pass.
4.4.2 Automating Rho. In determining the general risk behavior of a coach,
the initial factors that cause a coach to vary his play calling according to the amount
of risk he is willing to accept must be expounded. After brainstorming all the possible
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Table 24: Initial Football Game
4-4 Overload 5-4 Blitz 4-4 Zone 4-3 Man
Sweep -2.7 3.8 4 6.6
Middle Run 3.4 2 5.1 5.9
Short Pass 4 3.9 0.5 7.3
Long Pass 6.1 7 6.3 -3.4
factors that could affect risk behavior during a football game, design of experiments
can be used to determine the most influential factors, the factors that cause the
variation in the response variable certainty equivalent. A two-level fractional factorial
can be used to weed out the unimportant factors. Suppose that this process revealed
the most important factors as down, distance to go for a first down, field position,
time left in the game, and score of the game. For simplicity, the scenarios presented
herein assume the score and a time left in the game. Let’s also assume for the sake
of brevity that the remaining factors, down, distance, and field position, only possess
two levels, high and low. In reality, there may be four or more levels for each of the
original factors, the more the better. Table 25 shows a description of the high and
low levels of the three factors.
Table 25: Factor Levels
Factor High(+) Low(-)
Field Position ≥ 50 < 50
Down ≥ 3rd ≤ 2nd
Distance to Flag ≥ 8 < 8
Table 26 shows a simple setup of a design matrix that allows ρ to be automated
according to down, distance, and field position by inputting a certainty equivalent for
each design point. The decision maker is asked to answer a question at each of the
design points in Table 26. The question is the certain number of yards willing to be
accepted as a trade for the gamble: 50% chance of gaining 3 yards and 50% chance of
gaining 10 yards. The responses are given, if the decision maker chooses the expected
value, 6.5 in this case, he is considered a risk neutral individual. A value of larger
than 6.5 implies risk prone and less than 6.5 indicates a risk averse attitude. The
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values of the certainty equivalent have been formulated under the assumption that
player one is losing by 7 points with 5 minutes or less remaining in the game.
Table 26: User Risk Survey
Field Position(X1) Down(X2) Distance(X3) Certainty Equivalent(y)
+ + + 8
+ + - 6.3
+ - + 6
+ - - 5
- + + 9.5
- + - 8.5
- - + 8
- - - 7.5
While fitting a model to the input data, it is important to use the certainty
equivalent as the response. If the actual value of ρ is used, the model may need cubic
terms or higher, which will make the automation process much more difficult and time
consuming. After the model has been fit using the certainty equivalent, the values of
ρ can be calculated. An accurate model is fit using just main effects and interaction
terms. The design matrix X, initial y response vector, fitted values ŷ, standardized
CE z0.5, standardized ρ value P , and corresponding ρ are given in Table 27. z.5 is
computed using the certainty equivalent in Table 26 and Equation 16. For example,
z.5 for the first combination of factors in Table 26 is
z.5 = (CE − Low)/(High− Low)
= (8− 3)/(10− 3)
= .714
where high and low are the respective values of the lottery given to the decision maker.
Note, ρ is calculated by plugging z.5 into Table 11, obtaining a standardized value
of ρ, P , and then multiplying this by the range = high − low. For the first design
point, z.5 = .714 corresponds to an P value of -.52. This is multiplied by the range,
range = high− low = 7, to return ρ = −3.64. The values for ŷ were obtained using
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Table 27: Design Matrix for Automating ρ
Intercept X1 X2 X3 X1X2 X1X3 X2X3 y ŷ z0.5 P ρ
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 7.975 0.714285714 -0.52 -3.64
1 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 6.3 6.325 0.471428571 4.16 29.12
1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 6 6.025 0.428571429 1.76 12.32
1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 5 4.975 0.285714286 0.52 3.64
1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 9.5 9.525 0.928571429 -0.1 -0.7
1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 8.5 8.475 0.785714286 -0.32 -2.24
1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 8 7.975 0.714285714 -0.52 -3.64
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 7.5 7.525 0.642857143 -0.85 -5.95
the least squares technique from Equation 17 which yielded the following model:
ŷ = θ0 + θ1X1 + θ2X2 + θ3X3 + θ12X1X2 + θ13X1X3 + θ23X2X3
= 7.35− 1.025X1 + .725X2 + .525X3 + .1X1X2 + .15X1X3 + .15X2X3.
This may not seem useful at first glance, however when many variables are present
and several levels exist for each variable, it is imperative to have a prediction equation.
In this case the levels of the variables are categorical, either high or low. When the
levels of the factors are continuous, the time of game and the yardline for instance, it
is important to have the ability to predict between design points. Again, the above
equation is just the certainty equivalent for the situation where player one is losing by
7 points with 5 minutes or less remaining. Ideally, all of the factors will be included
in the model and the risk tolerance for every conceivable situation spanning the entire
length of the game will be approximated and automated.
Risk behavior can now be automated for any field position, down, and distance
to the first down according to the risk preferences of the decision maker, the coach in
this football scenario.
4.4.3 Running the Game. With the data from the initial game setup and
the risk preference function of the decision maker, the game commences. With 5
minutes remaining in the game and losing by 7 points, the offense is facing 3rd and 10
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on the -38 yardline (a negative sign in front of the yardline implies the offenses own
half of the field, whereas no sign implies the defensive half of the field). There are
60 minutes in an entire football game, the number of minutes are thus the time that
remains in the game. ρ1 is the risk tolerance of player one according to the inputs
of the situation of the game. ρ2 is the estimation of the risk tolerance of player two
by player one. We will assume for this scenario that player two (defense) knows the
risk tolerance of player one (offense) in most situations that arise during a football
game. The case where his assumption is wrong will be addressed further in upcoming
sections. All of these inputs combined are considered the situation of the game, S.
S1 = {Score, T imeRemaining, F ieldPosition, Down, Distance, ρ1, ρ2} (18)
= {−7, 5,−38, 3, 10,−.7,−.7}
shows the situation during the first play of the game. Obviously, the game will
normally begin with a score of 0-0 and 0 time elapsed. The game is started here to
show the application of the automation of ρ.
The risk tolerance of player one in (18) was found using the risk tolerance
function and Table 25. The offensive certainty equivalent in this situation is
ŷ = 7.35− 1.025X1 + .725X2 + .525X3 + .1X1X2 + .15X1X3 + .15X2X3
= 7.35− 1.025(−1) + .725(1) + .525(1) + .1(−1) + .15(−1) + .15(1)
= 9.525.
This number is converted to ρ using the procedure outlined above. Player one has a
risk tolerance of ρ = −.7, which is an extreme risk prone approach to the situation.
Initially, in the huddle, with lack of prior information about the defensive formation
β that player two will call, player one chooses from his action set
α = [Sweep,MiddleRun, ShortPass, LongPass]
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= [γ = {0, 0, .1538, .8462} |
β̂(0) = {4− 4Overload, 5− 4Blitz, 4− 4Zone, 4− 3Man},
the initial strategy of player one based on his risk tolerance during the situation and
his perception of all the available plays to player two. This shows that because of the
risk prone behavior of player one due to the situation, he will call the long pass 85%




= {δ|β̂(0)S1 } (19)
= {.8539, 0, 0, .1461}.
Player one believes player two will choose to run the 4-4 Overload or the 4-3 Man.
This makes sense looking at the normal form of the original game in Table 24 because
a risk prone attitude by player two will cause him to want to gain and not worry
about losing. The two negative numbers in the original reward matrix correspond to
those two actions.
As the quarterback approaches the line of scrimmage, he observes the defense
in either a 4-3 man or a 4-4 zone. The perceived actions available to player two are




= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = QBObservation}]
= [4− 4Zone, 4− 3Man]. (20)




= {γ|β̂(1)S1 } (21)
= {0, 0, .1933, .8067}.
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Even though player one knows that player two is defending heavily against the pass
by playing the 4-3 Man and the 4-4 Zone, he will still call a pass because he is in a
situation where he must get yards and a first down or he will lose the game. Player
one now chooses a play according to this distribution and possibly calls an audible to
his original play out of the huddle. Based on his knowledge of the actions available




= {.8067, .1933}, (22)




























yards. This is the amount of yards player one perceives he will gain. The actual yards
gained will be dependent on the actual strategy of player two, this is covered in the
post game analysis section. Suppose player one calls a long pass, a safety slips and
the offense gains 17 yards. The situation now updates to a new play:
S2 = {−7,4 : 45,45,1,10,12.32,12.32}.
Player one now takes a more risk averse attitude towards the situation because he
has a few more downs to get ten yards and he has crossed mid-field. In the huddle,
player one calls his play based on the situation only without perceived information










= {4− 4Overload, 5− 4Blitz, 4− 4Zone, 4− 3Man}, (23)




= {.0910, .4459, .2414, .2217}. (24)
There is a nice distribution across the offensive plays, running up the middle almost
half of the time. As the quarterback approaches the line, he observes that the defense




= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = QBObservation}]






= {0, 0, .8066, .1934},
running a short pass the majority of the time. This makes sense because the 4-4 zone
defends best against the short pass and player one is perceiving this defense to be




= {.8710, 0, .1290, }.
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= [β|ζ(2) = {ζ1 = QBObservation ∩ ζ2 = CoachObservation}]
= [4− 4Overload, 5− 4Blitz].




= {0, 0, 0, 1}.
It makes sense that the offense would choose a deep pass in the situation where the





























Suppose the offense ran the long pass, a lineman missed a block, and the quarterback
was sacked for a loss of 6 yards. Now,
S3 = {−7,4 : 15,−49,2,16,−3.64,−3.64}.




= {0, .2854, .3007, .4139},
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= {.3577, 0, .3192, .3231}.
Player one will choose to throw a long or short pass more often in this situation, but
still will run up the middle roughly 30% of the time because it is only second down.
The defense will not guard against the short run at all because they believe player
one to be risk prone, which means player one will not run up the middle. After the




= [4− 4Zone, 4− 3Man],




= {0, .8403, 0, .1597},





The offense runs up the middle the majority of the time because it observed the
defense to be guarding against the pass more heavily. By running this strategy, the
offense expects to gain
πS3 = 5.0693
yards. The offense runs up the middle and gains 11 yards. Thus,
S4 = {−7,3 : 57,40,3,5,29.12,29.12},
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the offense is using a strategy close to the expected case. This results in the initial




= {.0567, .3975, .3069, .2390}.
The offense either runs or throws a short pass with the highest probability in this
situation and can expect to gain
π̂S4 = 3.9546




= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = CoachObservation}]





= {0, .5415, .2555, .2030},




= {.6760, .1357, .1883}.
Because the defense is not using the formation that best guards against the run up
the middle, the offense chooses this play with greater probability. The quarterback




= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = CoachObservation ∩ ζ2 = QBObservation}]
= [4− 4Overload, 4− 3Man].
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= {0, 0, .7701, .2299},





The offense calls an audible according the preceding distribution. While running a
short pass, the offense gains just 4 yards, not enough for a first down. So,
S5 = {−7,3 : 39,36,4,1,29.12,29.12},
and the risk strategy remains the same. The initial perceived optimal strategy in this
situation is identical to γ̂
(0)
S4
. Upon arrival to the line of scrimmage, the quarterback




= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = QBObservation}]





= {.7970, 0, .0101, .1929}.




= {.7286, .0563, .2151},
the sweep is called with high probability while still leaving a chance of calling a long
pass to keep the defense on their toes. The coach on the sidelines further notices that
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= [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = QBObservation ∩ ζ2 = CoachObservation}]





= {0, 0, .7779, .2221}.
The offense abandons the sweep for the short pass as this will yield more yards against
the two perceived available defenses. The coach in the pressbox radios down to the
head coach exclaiming the defense to be in a 5-4 blitz formation and heavily guarding










= {0, 0, 0, 1}.
The offense calls the long pass, however it is batted down and the defense takes over
on downs. This section demonstrated the use of the methodology as applied to a
football game. Next, the methods and techniques are presented that allow further
optimization of offensive strategies for future situations and corrective action on the
strategies used during the game. With this new information, a different outcome may
be achieved in future situations.
4.4.4 Post-Game Analysis. During the game, it is best to use design of
experiments to explore the interactions between ρ1 and ρ2, as this is the most efficient
manner to quickly study behavior and outcomes. This is true whenever there are
constraints dealing with time or money. In a post game analysis setting with virtually
unlimited time, a proper approach would involve exploring each possible situation that
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Situation 2:
1st and 10 on 45
Situation 3:
2nd and 16 on -49
Situation 4:
3rd and 5 on 40
Situation 5:
4th and 1 on 36
Note: Offense is 
losing by 7 points 
with 5:00 remaining in 
the game.
Situation 1:
3rd and 10 on -38







Figure 6: Football Game Flow Chart
may arise. Following the game, the film could be reviewed and a thorough analysis
conducted on each combination of offensive and defensive strategies and utilities. This
could easily be done using the techniques presented in the game against nature case.
However, this section will demonstrate the use of DOE in the post-game setting.
This will lead to learning among the team and possibly the determination of a better
strategy to play in future game situations.
Each of the five situations will be examined to determine a better strategy for
similar future situations and the quality of observations made by the offense. The
interaction plots from the possible risk behaviors of player one and player two can be
examined to determine the best strategy for player one. The risk behavior of player
two is a noise factor, it cannot be controlled. Therefore, player one may choose to
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select the strategy that is most robust to any changes in the risk behavior of player
two.
4.4.4.1 Situation 1. Tending towards a more risk prone risk attitude
is the optimal choice when information about the action set available to player two
is unavailable. From Figure 7, it appears that the offense was utilizing the best
possible strategy in the first situation during the initial game setup. That is, the
risk prone approach provides the maximum number of yards gained regardless of the
risk strategy of player two. When player two plays the risk averse strategy, player
one gains the maximum number of yards by approaching the situation with a risk
prone attitude. However, when player two approaches the situation with a risk averse
attitude and player one takes a risk averse attitude, player one gains the minimum
number of yards. Using the updated information from the quarterback observation,
the offense used the poorest possible risk approach with the knowledge it possessed in
Equation 20, as shown in Figure 8. The risk prone approach is strictly dominated by
both the expected case and the risk averse strategy. If the offense used the expected




0 = {0, .9238, 0, .0762}
is the best approach for the offense. The offense is advised to alter its risk strategy
in future situations resembling situation 1 where the offense perceives the defense to
be in 4-4 zone or a 4-3 man. By playing the risk averse or expected case, the offense
guarantees a robust risk approach to the situation.
4.4.4.2 Situation 2. The initial optimal risk strategy is again that
of a risk prone nature as shown in Figure 7. The optimal risk strategy does not
change from situation to situation when all the actions are available to player two,
however it will differ depending on what action set player one perceives player two is
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ρ1 = Risk Averse
ρ1 = Expected Case
Figure 7: Initial ρ Interaction Plot
risk approach after the update by choosing the more risk averse behavior. When
the defense approaches the situation with a risk averse attitude, and the offense also
approaches the situation with risk averse attitude, the expected yards gained is only
around 4. The offense could have gained the maximum number of yards through the
use of a risk prone attitude, however this also introduced the possibility of gaining
less yards than the expected case if player two assumed player one to be risk prone.
In this situation, since the offense preferred to entertain a risk averse attitude due to
its preferences, of equal or better quality risk behavior would have been the expected
case. It is robust in that regardless of the risk attitude of player two, player one can
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ρ1 ρ2 Interation Plot in Design Region 4
 
 
ρ1 = Risk Averse
ρ1 = Expected Case
Figure 8: Updated ρ Interaction Plot at S1
4.4.4.3 Situation 3. In this situation, the quarterback perceived the
defense to again be in a 4-3 man or a 4-4 zone as in situation 1, thus the optimal risk
strategy is still available in Figure 8. The risk strategy of the offense in this situation
was not as risk prone as in the first situation, leading to a greater probability of calling
the run up the middle. The defensive pressure on the pass caused the offense to take
a different approach because they were not in an extreme risk behavior situation as
in situation 1. The offense was further from the extreme risk prone approach and
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ρ1 ρ2 Interation Plot in Design Region 4
 
 
ρ1 = Risk Averse
ρ1 = Expected Case
Figure 9: Updated ρ Interaction Plot at S2
4.4.4.4 Situation 4. During situation 4, the first update yields a
similar optimal risk strategy approach as that in the initial game setup in Figure
7. After the second update, the interaction plots for the risk strategy are almost
identical to that during the second situation at the first update in Figure 9. The
offense should have used a more risk prone attitude, possibly gaining more yards than
actually achieved during situation 4.
4.4.4.5 Situation 5. Initially, the best risk approach to take is the
same as the above cases, the risk prone strategy. Upon QB observation that the
defense is not in a 4-4 overload, the risk prone approach loses value. In Figure 10,
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Figure 10: First Update ρ Interaction Plot at S5
approach, there is a significant loss. Compared with the robustness of the expected
case, the risk prone strategy may not be the best approach. If the defense plays risk
averse, and the offense plays risk prone, the offense can expect to gain more yards than
in any other situation. The second update results in similar strategy implications as
that shown in Figure 11. The risk averse strategy produces similar results, when the
defense takes a risk prone approach to the scenario and the offense is risk averse, the
offense can expect to gain more yards. When the defense plays risk averse and the
offense is risk averse, the offense can expect to gain less yards.
4.4.5 Studying Game Film. The coaches may be interested in the quality
of their observations during games throughout the season. A way to measure how
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Figure 11: Second Update ρ Interaction Plot at S5
game tapes and comparing this with the perceived optimal decisions called during the
game.
Suppose the true defense in situation 1 was a 4-4 zone. Using Equation 7 on
page 26 and the perceived optimal strategy after all the updates, γ̂
(1)
S1
, the value of
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The true optimal value is calculated using the strategy that the offense would have











yards. This is the lost opportunity by the offense for not having perfect information.
That is, the offense lost 1.12 yards because they could only perceive the defensive
formation in part. To determine the value of the quarterback observation in this
scenario, the value of the game at s = 0 must be subtracted from the value at s = 1.
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The value at s = 0, or the original value of the game taking into consideration the


































The quarterback observation in this situation, even though correct, actually cost the
offense .23 yards of expected gain. Normally, a good observation will add value to the
game, this is a rare exception.
During situation 2, suppose the defense was truly in a 5-4 Blitz formation. In




= [4− 4Overload, 5− 4Blitz].
In this situation, even though the offense did not have full information about the









The true value of the game given the 5-4 Blitz is equal to the perceived value of the
game given the 5-4 Blitz as calculated in Equation 25. Gaining perfect information
in this situation would not be of value to the offense. The original strategy by the


























































The quarterback observation in this situation adds about .75 yards of expected gain
by the offense, this is good. The value of the coaches observation is found using the
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Situation 3 finds the defense truly in the 4-3 Man formation. Recall the offense
perceived the actions available to the defense as β̂
(1)
S3
= [4 − 4Zone, 4 − 3Man]. The



























































yards represents the number of yards the offense could expect to gain had they known
the defense was in a 4-3 Man. The value added by the quarterback observation is










is the number of yards gained due to the quarterback observation.
During situation 4, the offensive strategy failed to include the true action of the
defense as a possible action, the defense was actually in a 4-4 zone. The offense chose
to throw the short pass in the situation and only gained a few yards. The perceived




= [4− 4Overload, 4− 3Man].
96























































yards is significant and probably would have gained the offense a first down had they






















Individually studying the value added by the observations leads us to conclude the
QB observation was in error and cost the offense about 2.34 yards.
During the final situation, the offense perceived the defense to be in 5-4 Blitz
formation and decided to call a deep pass. The ball was knocked down and the defense




= [5− 4Blitz, 4− 3Man],
was correct up to the second update. The true defensive formation was a 4-3 Man,






The strategy used by the offense resulted in a loss of opportunity of 10.7 yards. With
true information, the offense would have surely gained a first down and possibly won
the game.
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The performance of the offense can be graphed over time to determine the
quality of the reads by the quarterback, sideline coach, and pressbox coach collectively
and individually. Using the value of perfect information ~π at each situation gives a feel
for the performance. The difference between the true and perceived optimal decisions
can also be thought of as the regret or error that the offense shouldered because of their
perception. If the perception by the offense is the defensive formation that the defense
actually runs, perfect information has no value. When the offensive perception is in
error or incomplete, the offensive regret increases, or the value of obtaining perfect
information increases. A high value of perfect information indicates a poor perception
by the offense. Looking at Figure 12, the error of the offensive strategy increased over































Error of Offensive Strategy vs Time
Figure 12: Value of Perfect Information
time, indicating that the offensive perception of the defensive formation degraded as
the game progressed. This is computed by using the true optimal strategy given the
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truth in each situation. This is subtracted from the value of the perceived optimal
strategy given the truth. For example, during situation 1, the true defensive formation
was the 4-4 zone. The true optimal offensive strategy for the 4-4 zone is
γS1 = {0, 0, 0, 1}.
This results in a true optimal value of the game
πS1 = γS1 RS1 δ
′
S1











The perceived value of the game is
π̂S1 = γ̂S1 RS1 δ
′
S1











Subtracting these two values gives the error of the offensive strategy during situation 1,
6.3− 5.18 = 1.12. The performance of each individual observer can also be examined
over time. The value added in relation to the previous time step or update can
be determined. Figure 13, shows the value added to the game by the quarterback
over time. The observation of the quarterback hurt the value of the game during
situation 4. The value of all the observations is a better measure of how well the
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Value of QB Observations over time
Figure 13: QB Added Value over time
offense is reading the defense, as the observations or sensors are not independent, each
observation relies on the previous. Figure 14 shows the value of all the observations
over time. During situations 2 and 3, the observations of the offense added a significant
number of yards to the expected gain, while during situations 4 and 5, the offensive
observations actually impaired their strategy.
These are simple examples, in reality this graph may contain much more insight
into the performance of an individual over the course of a season or game. This may
indicate things such as fatigue during a game, or learning during the game. Over
a season, these graphs could show the maturity gained by a junior quarterback, or
lack there of. In this way, the performance of individuals or coaches (sensors) can be
analyzed.
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Value of Observations over time
Figure 14: Observations Added Value over time
4.5 Allocations of Financial Funds
4.5.1 Introduction. This methodology can be used in various financial situ-
ations. A major beneficiary of this research could be the government. Military and
government budgeting is certainly dependent on the many given states of the world.
As new information is gained over time, resources need to be optimally dispersed to
ensure they are utilized properly and the contributions of the citizens are not squan-
dered in needless pursuits. An area of high visibility at the present age is the proper
way to allocate our nations resources in defense against potential terrorist attacks.
This can be modeled as a two-player game where player one is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and player two is the terrorist regime. The action sets
of player one and player two are the amount of resources to allocate to certain eco-
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nomic areas and possible targets to attack, respectively. As intelligence information
is received about the desirable attack locations of the terrorists, our resources can
be properly allocated to reduce the damage that will result from the attacks. This
section will present a simple example of how this methodology could be used to reduce
the amount of damage caused by terrorists.
4.5.2 Resource Allocations of Terrorist Funds. There has recently been
much research done in the area of reward matrices for possible terrorist attacks and the
amount of resources allocated to the particular target. For this example, the reward
matrix is kept simple, used solely for the purposes of demonstrating the methodology.
The reward matrix in this example will assume the same scale used in the combat
game example, a Likert scale from -5 to 5, with -5 being the worst possible outcome.
After speaking with the DHS, the outcomes from the experts are given in Table 28.
Keep in mind, the values here are just rated values. In reality, these will be some
Table 28: Normal Form of Terrorist Resource Allocation
Airline Subway Downtown Businesses Anthrax Mail
Public Transportation 5 4.5 -2 -5
Government Agencies -5 -4 -1 3
Urban Areas -3 -2 5 -4
.
function of lives lost, resources, and economic impact for example.
Suppose that information is unavailable about the intent of the terrorist orga-
nization, each of the four targets are possible areas for attack. The strategy of player
one is calculated as in the previous examples,
γ̂(s)ρ1 = {w1, w2, w3}
γ̂
(0)
0 = {.3977, .5088, .0936}
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these being the percentages of resources to allocate to the three areas of protection.
The strategy of the terrorists is
δ̂
(0)
0 = {.3216, 0, .3158, .3626}.
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Figure 15: Initial Effects of Risk Behavior
strategy appears to be the best strategy for the DHS without any information about
the actions of the terrorists. Regardless of the risk behavior of the terrorists, the risk
prone strategy gives higher payoffs. The best perceived allocation of resources is then
γ̂
(0)
−1 = {.1644, .7378, .0979}.
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Notice this still results in a loss the majority of the time, but is the best strategy
player one can play in this situation.
Next, suppose the DHS received intelligence that the terrorists were abandoning
attacks on the public transportation, the airlines and the subway, because the security
measures imposed by the U.S. had increased the difficulty to a level far too great for
the terrorists to achieve results. Now,
β̂(1) = [β|ζ(1) = {ζ1 = Intelligence}]
= [DowntownBusinesses, AnthraxMail]





= {0, .6923, .3077}.
It makes sense that the DHS would remove funding from an area where no threat
was present. Again, this example is extreme and is for demonstration purposes only.
Furthermore, the perceived probabilities of attacks are
δ̂
(1)
0 = {.5385, .4615}.
The effects of risk behavior in this situation can be seen in Figure 16. In this case,
taking the risk prone or risk averse attitude towards the situation could result in
great gains OR great losses. The expected case is the most robust risk strategy to
approach the situation with. Regardless of the risk strategy of the terrorists, the DHS
is guaranteed a gain of around 1. This allocation of resources will protect best against
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Figure 16: Updated Effects of Risk Behavior
Suppose finally that the DHS received information from a CIA spy that the
terrorists had ceased talk about attacking downtown businesses and increased talks
about attacks on public transportation, subways and airports. Thus,
β̂(2) = [β|ζ(2) = {ζ1 = Intelligence ∩ ζ2 = CIA Spy}]





= {.4444, .5556, 0}.
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The perceived terrorist strategy is
δ̂
(2)
0 = {.1644, .7378, .0979},

























The risk behavior interactions can be seen in Figure 17. The DHS does not want to
be risk averse in this situation as this will lead to the greatest loss regardless of the




= {.1823, .8177, 0}.
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Figure 17: Updated Effects of Risk Behavior
During the holiday season, the terrorists may be more risk prone in their approach,

























if the terrorists took an extreme risk approach. By playing risk prone, we protect
ourselves best against a risk prone strategy by the terrorists.
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In conclusion, the terrorists know that public transportation is very important
to us, thus they will actually attack it less. Since we both know the importance
of it, it is actually played less because of the dynamics of game theory. This section
shows a very simple yet demonstrative use of the methodology on a resource allocation
problem. The adversarial nature of the terrorists results in a natural application of
game theory.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the results of using the methodology from chapter 3
to update optimal decisions and measure differences between perceived optimal and
optimal decisions. The results are entirely intuitive and show that the methodology
could surely be used to accurately represent situations in a simulation model as well
as to make actual decisions based on information available. The next chapter presents
a conclusion of the work accomplished and the direction for future research.
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
This thesis presents a methodology for updating optimal decisions over time as
new information is obtained. The three objectives of the research are:
1. Develop a methodology that automatically updates an optimal decision over
time based on the information available to a decision maker at each time step
2. Develop the methodology to capture the effects of incomplete or inaccurate
information by measuring the difference between the perceived optimal decision
that is based on this inaccurate information and the true optimal decision which
is based on perfect information
3. Present a technique to explore the implications of decision maker risk behavior
and subsequently suggest better alternatives
The first objective was accomplished using game theory. Methodology was
developed that allows an optimal decision to be updated based on the perceived
actions available to the other players of the game.
The second objective was completed using the methodology presented in the first
objective and further developing the methodology to capture this difference between
the perceived optimal decision and the true optimal decision using the value of the
game.
The third objective was accomplished through the use of utility theory and
response surface methodology. Utility theory is used to transform the reward matrices
to produce different strategies for different types of players. A good risk strategy to
approach a situation with is then determined subject to the amount of variability
in the value of the game willing to be accepted, this variability being completely
explained by ρ. This is done through exploring the surface of the response, the value
of the game, and is different for each game encountered.
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5.2 Model Assumptions
Many of the assumptions considered while using the presented techniques could
be eliminated through further research. This initial study provides the framework for
updating optimal decisions using game theory in zero-sum, static two-player games
with complete information. The main assumptions underlying the game theoretic
approach used in this research are
1. Minimax/Maximin Principle - The players of the game are rational decision
makers. Player one is trying to maximize his minimum gain while player two is
trying to minimize the maximum gain of player one.
2. Zero-sum - The rewards of the outcome sum to zero. The gain of player one is
the same as the loss of player two.
3. Sequential and Simultaneous - This theory is sequential in that each player
makes decisions based on the perception of the available actions to the other
player. However, it is simultaneous in that each player makes a decision without
knowing the moves of the other player with certainty.
4. Non-Cooperative - The players of the game are in a conflict with one another
and the chance for cooperative bargaining to arise is zero.
5. Static Rewards - The rewards of the players of the game do not change over
time.
6. Complete Information - Each player knows the reward matrix with certainty.
5.2.1 Model Strengths. There are numerous strengths in using these tech-
niques. Specifically, it allows a decision maker to update the optimal decision policy
based on new information as it arrives. Utility theory allows flexibility in this model
by allowing any type of decision maker to be represented. Exploring good risk strate-
gies in approach to each situation further strengthens the quality of the decision. This
methodology has many strengths and assumptions which opens the door for future
research.
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5.2.2 Alternative Application Areas. This study focused on combat and
sports games to demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology. Clearly, this research
could be applied to a plethora of research areas. Determining the proper allocation of
resources as new information becomes available would be useful at the personal and
corporate levels. Presently, an entire re-formulation of the problem must occur to
update the proper allocations. This research could allow an efficient update based only
on new information about nature or the moves of other companies as it is perceived.
Considering the adversarial nature of terrorists, this methodology could be used
to determine optimal allocation of resources in defense of our nations assets based
on new information as it becomes available. Each time we receive intelligence about
the actions of terrorist groups, our optimal allocation of resources will update. The
utility of the reward matrix will also change over time for the terrorists. For instance,
during the holiday season, the utility of a successful attack on the airports is higher for
the terrorist. The usefulness of these methods on this problem was demonstrated in
chapter 4, however more research needs to be done to accurately capture the context
of the game.
Certainly, this research can be applied in the manufacturing arena. As demand
is observed over time, how can supply be optimally updated? Also, the amount of risk
a company is willing to take to achieve greater gains becomes of special importance.
Furthermore, this theory can be used in other sports application areas, providing
teams with the best strategy to use based on the information they are observing about
the behavior of the opponents.
5.3 Further Research
This study generates copious follow on research opportunities. This is the first
use of game theory to update optimal decisions, thus the various directions of game
theory not touched during this research are ripe for immediate attention. These
include multi-player games, dynamic reward matrices, non-zero sum games where
112
each player has different rewards, cooperative games where players consider alliances,
and incomplete information games. These are just a few of the many areas that need
expanding after the release of this research.
Much research has been accomplished with regard to the proper specification
of the reward matrix. These accurate reward matrices need to be applied to this
research.
Chapter four presented an example using a priori distributions to base an opti-
mal decision policy on in the game against nature case. This needs to be formalized
as normally the decision maker will have information about the other player of the
game. Also, this needs to be expanded to the player one versus player two game
to account for prior knowledge about the actions of the other decision maker. This
will account for the assumption that player two is always attempting to minimize the
maximum loss of player one.
A continuous scale needs to be employed for the automated risk tolerance design
matrix, so any values can be plugged in for time, down, distance, etc. This research
only considers the discrete case. Additionally, the automation of the risk preference
was determined through questioning individual decision makers. The determination of
the appropriate function of the input factors and the risk preference was different for
each decision maker. There is probably a general model that will accurately describe
every type of decision maker, at least approximately for each type of game. This
deserves future research, as it would lead to a more efficient approximation of the risk
tolerance than the method presented.
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Appendix A. MATLAB Code
























25 Player1Strategy: The optimal strategy of player one given the
26 reward matrix.
27








36 % Player Strategies using Game Theory Algorithm %
37 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
38
39 %%%% Calculate Player 1 and Player 2 optimal strategies %%%%
40
41 %% Size of Reward Matrix
42 s=size(R);
43




47 %% Number of columns in Reward Matrix
48 w=s(1,2);
49
50 %% CHECKING FOR SADDLE POINT &&
51
















































99 [x,fval,exitflag,output,lambda] = linprog(f,A,b,Aeq,beq,lb);
100 Player1Strategy=x(2:h+1,1);
101








110 [x2,fval,exitflag,output,lambda] = linprog(f2,A2,b2,Aeq2,beq2,lb2);
111 Player2Strategy=x2(2:w+1,1);
112 end





















21 RT: Risk tolerance of player 1




26 StrategyMat: Gives the strategies of the two players, the input







34 %% Size of original Reward Matrix
35 s=size(R);
36 %% Number of rows in original Reward Matrix
37 h=s(1,1);
38 %% Number of columns in original Reward Matrix
39 w=s(1,2);
40











52 %% Transforms original reward matrix using risk tolerance
53 [transR]=Transform(R,RT);
54
55 %% Passes transformed R into Optimal Strategy to get optimal
56 %% strategy of player 1
57 [Player1Strategy,Player2Strategy] = OptimalStrategy(transR);
58
59 %% Extracts optimal strategy of player 2 based on risk tolerance
60 [Player2Strategy]=P2Strategy(R,RT2);
61



















16 Transforms reward matrix to account for risk strategies of the




21 R: Original reward matrix
22




27 transR: The transformed reward matrix after accounting for





33 %% Size of original Reward Matrix
34 s=size(R);
35 %% Number of rows in original Reward Matrix
36 h=s(1,1);
37 %% Number of columns in original Reward Matrix
38 w=s(1,2);
39



































20 R: Original reward matrix
21












33 % Passes transformed reward matrix to extract optimal strategy for player 2

















16 Generates response surface of the risk strategy of player one and




21 R: The original reward matrix the strategies are calculated from









31 %% Size of original Reward Matrix
32 s=size(R);
33 %% Number of rows in original Reward Matrix
34 h=s(1,1);






40 %RTM=[-50 -24.75 -1 1 24.75 50];
41 RTM=[-1:-1:-50,50:-1:1];
42 %RTM=[-1 -2 -5 -10 -20 -50 50 20 10 5 2 1];
43 for j=1:length(RTM)
44 RT=RTM(1,j);



















































95 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}1 Risk Prone’)
96 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
97 axis([-51 0 min(mean)-((max(mean)-min(mean))/8)...
98 max(mean)+((max(mean)-min(mean))/8)])





104 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}1 Risk Prone’)
105 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
106 axis([-51 0 0 ...
107 max(variance)+((max(variance)-min(variance))/8)])





113 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}1 Expected Case’)
114 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
115 axis([0 51 min(mean)-((max(mean)-min(mean))/8)...
116 max(mean)+((max(mean)-min(mean))/8)])





122 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}1 Expected Case’)
123 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
124 axis([0 51 0 ...
125 max(variance)+((max(variance)-min(variance))/8)])
126 title(’Variance of Risk Averse Strategy’)
122















16 Calculates response for the designed experiment in the two




21 R: The original reward matrix the strategies are calculated from
22 rn: Risk neutral risk parameter rho for the reward matrix





































16 Generates the response surface of the risk strategies of the players














31 %% This script generates interaction plots for my design
32 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
33
34 %% Gets response for Reward Matrix
35 [y] = design(R);
36










46 legend(’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’,’{\rho}1 = Risk Prone’)
47 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}2 Expected Case’)
48 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
49 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 1’)
50 set(gca,’xtick’,[-1 1])
51 axis([-1.5 1.5 min(y)-((max(y)-min(y))/8) max(y)+((max(y)-min(y))/8)])
52









62 legend(’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’,’{\rho}1 = Risk Prone’)
63 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}2 Risk Prone’)
64 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
65 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 2’)
66 set(gca,’xtick’,[-1 1])
67 axis([-1.5 1.5 min(y)-((max(y)-min(y))/8) max(y)+((max(y)-min(y))/8)])
68
69









79 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Averse’,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
80 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}2 Expected Case’)
81 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
82 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 3’)
83 set(gca,’xtick’,[-1 1])
84 axis([-1.5 1.5 min(y)-((max(y)-min(y))/8) max(y)+((max(y)-min(y))/8)])
85
86










96 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Averse’,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
97 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}2 Risk Prone’)
98 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
99 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 4’)
100 set(gca,’xtick’,[-1 1])



















































































81 cs = contour(P1,P2,Z);
82 clabel(cs)
83




88 zlabel(’Value of Game to Player 1’)


























26 3-d response surface
27 Contour plot of response surface
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46 %columns in X
47 w=s(1,2);
48 %rows in X
49 h=s(1,1);
50
51 [y] = design(R);














































97 zlabel(’Value of Game to Player 1’)






























24 True response surface of the two-player game. This is complimentary













































69 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Prone’ ,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
70 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}2 Expected Case’)
71 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
72 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 1’)
73
74 axis([.5 50.5 (min(min(y,y1)))-((max(max(y,y1)))-(min(min(y,y1))))...
75 (max(max(y,y1)))+(max(max(y,y1))-(min(min(y,y1))))])
76



































111 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Prone’,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
112 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}2 Risk Prone’)
113 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
114 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 2’)
115
116 axis([-50.5 -.5 (min(min(y,y1)))-((max(max(y,y1)))-(min(min(y,y1))))...
117 (max(max(y,y1)))+(max(max(y,y1))-(min(min(y,y1))))])
118



































153 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Averse’ ,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
154 xlabel(’Risk Averse {\rho}2 Expected Case’)
155 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
156 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 3’)
157
158 axis([.5 50.5 (min(min(y,y1)))-((max(max(y,y1)))-(min(min(y,y1))))...
159 (max(max(y,y1)))+(max(max(y,y1))-(min(min(y,y1))))])
160



































195 legend(’{\rho}1 = Risk Averse’,’{\rho}1 = Expected Case’)
196 xlabel(’Expected Case {\rho}2 Risk Prone’)
197 ylabel(’y = Value of Game to Player 1’)
198 title(’{\rho}1 {\rho}2 Interation Plot in Design Region 4’)
199
























































































































































































21 R: The original reward matrix the strategies are calculated from
22 N: Number of survey responses
23 Combat: 1 if using a Likert scale between -5 and 5, 0 if no










34 % Combat = 1 or 0, 1 if this is a combat scenario



























61 %% USE FOR RANDOMIZING REWARD MATRIX %%







69 R = roundn(Rmat,-1);
70





































107 ylabel(’Value of Game \pi’)





113 ylabel(’Value of Game \pi’)
114 title(’Value of Game as N increases’)
115 hold on
116 plot(n,TrueOptimalRiskMat’,’r’)
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